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 SPANISH SUMMARY
  
1. INTRODUCCIÓN GENERAL 
La emoción y la cognición son dos aspectos fundamentales en la vida mental que, 
aunque se entienden como distintos, están profusamente relacionados entre sí 
(Dalgleish & Power, 1999; Paul Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Martin & Clore, 2001). Estas 
abundantes interacciones han generado tradicionalmente un vivo interés en el campo 
de la psicología cognitiva, de tal manera que áreas específicas de estudio como los 
vínculos entre la memoria y la emoción, han sido objeto de intensa investigación (e.g. 
Banich et al., 2009; Christianson, 1992; LeDoux, 1994; Reisberg & Hertel, 2004). 
Las interacciones entre memoria y emoción son especialmente interesantes, ya 
que dan lugar a diferentes consecuencias dependiendo de si la emoción es o no 
relevante para la tarea en curso. Siguiendo el concepto de "atención motivada" 
propuesto por Peter J. Lang y colaboradores (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998; Lang, 
Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993), los estímulos emocionales representarían 
información intensamente ligada a la supervivencia del organismo, como la comida o los 
depredadores (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; LeDoux, 1996; Ohman, Flykt, & Ludqvist, 
2000). Por esta razón, la información emocional tiene un acceso preferente a nuestro 
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sistema cognitivo y recluta recursos atencionales que mejoran nuestra preparación para 
procesar dicha información biológicamente relevante (Armony & Dolan, 2002; Bradley 
et al., 2003; Lang, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, et al., 1998; Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 
1997; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998; Ohman et al., 2000; Sabatinelli, Bradley, 
Fitzsimmons, & Lang, 2005). En lo que concierne a la memoria, este fenómeno tiende a 
hacer la información emocional más resistente al olvido, ya que es extremadamente 
adaptativo recordar dónde crecen los frutos más grandes o qué animales son los más 
peligrosos. La investigación de laboratorio en Psicología ha demostrado que la 
información emocional se recuerda mejor que la información no emocional (Canli, Zhao, 
Brewer, Gabrieli, & Cahill, 2000; Dietrich et al., 2001; E. B. Jones, O’Gorman, & Byrne, 
1987; Kensinger, 2007; Ochsner, Krou, Dobbins, & Lazzara, 2000; Schmidt & Williams, 
2001) pero, ¿qué sucede cuando la información emocional no es relevante para la tarea 
en la que uno está involucrado? En tales circunstancias, nuestra predisposición natural a 
procesar profundamente la información emocional convierte estos elementos en 
fuertes interferencias que compiten con la información relevante, provocando un 
deterioro en el desempeño de la tarea (Anticevic, Repovs, & Barch, 2010; Chuah et al., 
2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos, Diaz-Granados, Wang, & McCarthy, 2008; Dolcos & 
McCarthy, 2006). 
No existen muchos estudios que hayan explorado el efecto perjudicial de los 
estímulos emocionales en el mantenimiento de la información no emocional en 
memoria a corto plazo. El método más habitual ha recurrido a paradigmas de 
reconocimiento demorado en memoria operativa (MO), en los que los participantes 
tienen que memorizar diferentes tipos de material no emocional y mantenerlo en 
memoria mientras se presentan estímulos emocionales (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et 
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al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013a, 2008; 
Dolcos, Kragel, Wang, & McCarthy, 2006; Iordan, Dolcos, Denkova, & Dolcos, 2013; Oei 
et al., 2011). En general, los resultados muestran que los distractores emocionales 
desagradables pueden afectar el mantenimiento de elementos no emocionales en MO 
(Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Oei et al., 2011), de 
acuerdo con la idea introducida anteriormente: si un estímulo para el que estamos 
biológicamente predeterminados a no ignorar (es decir, los estímulos emocionales) se 
presenta en el contexto de una tarea de MO, funcionará como una potente 
interferencia y perjudicará la recuperación de la información relevante más que otras 
interferencias no emocionales. Sin embargo, otros estudios no han encontrado este 
efecto perjudicial a nivel global, sino sólo en subgrupos de participantes (Dolcos et al., 
2008; Iordan, Dolcos, & Dolcos, 2013) o en los ensayos en los que los voluntarios 
estaban más seguros de su respuesta (Denkova et al., 2010). Estas discrepancias se han 
atribuido a diferencias individuales en impulsividad atencional (Dolcos et al., 2008) y en 
procesamiento emocional (Denkova et al., 2010), si bien las posibles diferencias en 
mecanismos generales de control cognitivo que podrían explicar dichas diferencias, no 
han sido aún evaluadas. 
Siguiendo la lógica que postula que los estímulos emocionales funcionan como 
poderosas interferencias, ya que representan información biológicamente relevante, los 
estímulos emocionalmente agradables también producirían niveles equivalentes de 
interferencia en MO. De hecho, algunos autores han sugerido que los estímulos 
altamente activantes, independientemente de si son agradables o desagradables, 
pueden reclutar más recursos atencionales (de Oca, Villa, Cervantes, & Welbourne, 
2012; Lang, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, et al., 1998) que elementos neutros. Sin embargo, el 
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efecto real de los distractores emocionales con valencia positiva en el mantenimiento 
en  MO no se ha abordado todavía. 
Durante la última década, varios estudios de neuroimagen han utilizado la 
Imagen por Resonancia Magnética funcional (fMRI) para estudiar los mecanismos 
neurales que subyacen al control cognitivo de la distracción emocional. Una parte 
importante de estos experimentos ha identificado un patrón de actividad diferenciado 
entre la superficie más dorsal del cerebro, incluyendo la corteza prefrontal dorsolateral 
(DLPFC) y la corteza parietal lateral (LPC), que tradicionalmente se han relacionado con 
el funcionamiento ejecutivo y la MO (Berryhill & Olson, 2008; D’Esposito, Postle, & 
Rypma, 2000; Derrfuss, Brass, & von Cramon, 2004; Koenigs, Barbey, Postle, & Grafman, 
2009; Nee et al., 2013; Smith & Jonides, 1999), y las áreas ventrales del cerebro, 
incluyendo la corteza orbitofrontal (OFC), la corteza prefrontal ventrolateral (VLPFC) , la 
corteza occipitotemporal (OTC) y la amígdala , que tradicionalmente se han relacionado 
con el procesamiento emocional y la regulación de las emociones (Davidson & Irwin, 
1999; Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012; Phan, 
Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). Los distractores desagradables parecen disminuir la 
actividad cerebral de áreas dorsales/ejecutivas del cerebro mientras que 
simultáneamente, aumentan la actividad en regiones ventrales/emocionales. En 
resumen, los distractores desagradables parecen incrementar las influencias 
ascendentes de las regiones ventrales/emocionales sobre las áreas dorsales/ejecutivas 
del cerebro, reasignando recursos atencionales hacia los estímulos emocionales y 
afectando negativamente el rendimiento en MO (ver Dolcos et al., 2011 para una 
revisión). 
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Sin embargo, nuestro sistema cognitivo y más específicamente nuestra MO, no 
se afecta constantemente cada una de las veces que nos enfrentamos a un distractor 
emocional, de tal manera que nuestro sistema cognitivo debe contar con mecanismos 
de control eficaces para anular la interferencia emocional. De hecho, regiones 
específicas parte de estos sistemas dorsal/ejecutivo y ventral/emocional, a saber, la 
VLPFC y la DLPFC se han encontrado involucradas en el control efectivo de la distracción 
emocional en MO (Anticevic et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2013a, 
2006). 
Mientras que la literatura neurocientífica en este campo ha proporcionado 
información sustancial sobre las regiones particulares del cerebro implicadas en el 
control cognitivo de distracción emocional en MO, la dinámica temporal de dicha 
actividad neural no ha sido explorada, aun cuando  este enfoque proporcionaría 
información muy valiosa acerca de la naturaleza exacta de este proceso cognitivo.  
Por otra parte, hoy en día existe un amplio consenso en la idea de que el cerebro 
humano no funciona como un sistema modular, en el que cada función está 
relativamente localizada en un sector específico. En su lugar, nuestro comportamiento 
emerge del funcionamiento integral de redes complejas y dinámicas ampliamente 
distribuidas en el cerebro (ver Sporns, 2011 para un intoductión al concepto de las redes 
del cerebro). 
El mantenimiento activo de información se ha descrito como el resultado de la 
actividad sincronizada y sostenida de grupos locales de neuronas, así como de redes 
funcionales ampliamente distribuidas en el cerebro (Fuster & Alexander, 1971; 
Goldman-Rakic, 1990; Miller, 1996). En particular, estudios recientes han señalado que 
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el acoplamiento funcional a larga distancia entre áreas frontales y posteriores sería un 
mecanismo clave en el mantenimiento de información en MO (Gazzaley, Rissman, & 
D’Esposito, 2004; Palva, Monto, Kulashekhar, & Palva, 2010; Rissman, Gazzaley, & 
D’Esposito, 2004, 2008; Sarnthein, 1998; Sauseng, Klimesch, Schabus, & Doppelmayr, 
2005). 
Varios estudios han explorado el efecto de la distracción no emocional en las 
redes cerebrales funcionales de la MO, centrándose en la corteza prefrontal y las áreas 
posteriores del cerebro. Este enfoque se basa en la extensa literatura que vincula la 
corteza fronto-parietal a los procesos de mantenimiento activo en MO (e.g. Curtis & 
D’Esposito, 2003; Pessoa, Gutierrez, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2002; Rowe, Toni, 
Josephs, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 2000) y las áreas occipito-temporales a la 
formación de la representación sensorial del estímulo en la MO visual (e.g. Desimone, 
1998; Fuster, 1990; Miyashita, 2000). Mediante este procedimiento, estudios recientes 
han descrito alteraciones en el grado de conectividad funcional entre la corteza 
prefrontal y la corteza sensorial posterior debidas a la aparición de elementos 
distractores, y que dichas alteraciones pueden restaurarse tras la presentación del 
distractor para conseguir un desempeño correcto en MO (Clapp, Rubens, & Gazzaley, 
2010; Clapp, Rubens, Sabharwal, & Gazzaley, 2011; Yoon, Curtis, & D’Esposito, 2006). 
A pesar de estas evidencias, muy pocos trabajos han utilizado medidas de 
conectividad funcional en el estudio de las dinámicas cerebrales implicadas en el control 
de la distracción emocional, y todos ellos han limitado sus análisis a las conexiones 
concretas entre la amígdala y la corteza prefrontal (Chuah et al., 2010; Clarke & 
Johnstone, 2013; Dolcos et al., 2006), sin explorar las redes posteriors relacionadas con 
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el mantenimiento de información en MO (e.g. Corbetta, Kincade, & Shulman, 2002; 
Todd & Marois, 2004). 
La motivación de la presente serie de estudios es la de contribuir a llenar los 
vacíos de la literatura existente en relación con el control cognitivo de distracción 
emocional en MO. Para lograr este objetivo, se comenzó con dos experimentos 
conductuales con la intención de replicar resultados previos, explorar el efecto de los 
estímulos agradables como distractores y aclarar el papel de las diferencias individuales 
en los mecanismos de control cognitivo que limitan la distracción emocional en MO. En 
el siguiente estudio, recurrimos a la magnetoencefalografía (MEG) para investigar la 
dinámica espacio-temporal de los mecanismos cerebrales que nos permiten controlar la 
distracción emocional agradable y desagradable. Por último, utilizamos medidas de 
conectividad funcional para analizar la dinámica de las redes funcionales cerebrales que 
sostienen los procesos cognitivos de mantenimiento activo en MO, durante la 
distracción emocional. 
2. OBJETIVOS E HIPÓTESIS GENERALES 
2.1. Primer estudio 
En este estudio se diseñó una tarea de MO en la que los elementos relevantes 
para la tarea fueron caras neutrales, mientras que los distractores fueron imágenes 
emocionales y no emocionales irrelevantes para la tarea, con el fin de explorar el efecto 
de los distractores tanto agradables como desagradables en el mantenimiento en MO. Si 
los efectos perjudiciales de la distracción desagradable se deben a la relevancia 
biológica de estos estímulos y a nuestra predisposición natural para procesarlos 
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profundamente, otro tipo de estímulos biológicamente relevantes, como los eventos 
agradables, debería afectar el rendimiento de forma similar. También se estudió el 
efecto potencial de la distracción emocional y no emocional, en comparación con un 
mantenimiento de información sin interferencia, añadiendo una cuarta condición al 
diseño original, en la que no se presentó ningún estímulo distractor. Por último, se 
evaluó la capacidad individual de control inhibitorio en memoria, mediante el uso de 
una prueba neuropsicológica estandarizada. Si la inhibición cognitiva y la capacidad de 
resolución de interferencia son los procesos clave implicados en el control de la 
distracción, los participantes con las puntuaciones más altas en esta capacidad 
mostrarían una mayor precisión y unos tiempos de reacción más cortos en la fase de 
reconocimiento.  
2.2. Segundo estudio 
En el segundo estudio se utilizó una tarea de MO muy similar a la empleada en el 
primer estudio, y la implementamos en un experimento de MEG. El objetivo principal de 
este estudio fue desvelar los perfiles espaciotemporales de la actividad cerebral que 
subyace a los mecanismos de control cognitivo involucrados en la resistencia a la 
distracción emocional. En base a la evidencia previa que muestra procesamiento 
temprano de los estímulos emocionales (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Bradley et al., 2003; 
Carretié, Hinojosa, Martín-Loeches, Mercado, & Tapia, 2004; Pourtois, Dan, Grandjean, 
Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2005), postulamos que los estímulos emocionales aumentarán la 
respuesta cerebral en las latencias tempranas del procesamiento de la distracción. Dado 
que dicha activación temprana se ha descrito en tareas perceptuales, en las que los 
estímulos emocionales no tienen que ser controlados, postulamos también que el 
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control efectivo de los distractores emocionales ocurrirá más tarde en el procesamiento, 
y que dicho control cognitivo estará relacionado con una mayor activación de las 
cortezas prefrontales. Por último, y basándonos en los resultados obtenidos en el 
primer estudio sugerimos que las diferencias entre el control cognitivo de distracción 
agradable y la desagradable serán también evidentes a nivel de la actividad cerebral. 
2.3. Tercer estudio  
En el tercer estudio se recurrió al análisis de la conectividad funcional en los 
datos obtenidos en el segundo estudio para determinar el efecto potencial de la 
distracción emocional en las dinámicas de conectividad funcional que han sido 
observadas en el mantenimiento en MO. En base a la literatura existente que muestra 
que la interrupción no emocional puede alterar transitoriamente las conexiones fronto-
posteriores (Clapp et al., 2010, 2011; Yoon et al., 2006) esperamos que dicha red se 
afecte más debido a la distracción emocionales que debido a la distracción neutra. De 
acuerdo con la extensa literatura que vincula la VLPFC con el éxito en el control de la 
distracción emocional (Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 
2013, 2006; Iordan et al., 2013) esperamos también que esta región prefrontal esté 
fuertemente conectada con regiones posteriores. 
3. DISCUSIÓN GENERAL 
En la Introducción general revisamos la literatura existente en relación con el 
control cognitivo de la distracción emocional en MO, desde el nivel conductual hasta los 
enfoques más avanzados consistentes en la aplicación de métodos de conectividad 
funcional en el estudio de las redes dinámicas que sustentan dicho proceso cognitivo. 
Nuestra revisión identificó varias lagunas en el conocimiento actual acerca de cómo 
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nuestro sistema cognitivo se ve afectado por los distractores emocionales, y cómo es 
capaz de anular este efecto, con el fin de llevar a cabo distintas tareas en el día a día. 
A nivel conductual, parece estar claro que los distractores desagradables pueden 
comportarse como potentes interferencias en la MO debido a su relevancia biológica, 
aunque el efecto de otro tipo de estímulos ligados a la supervivencia no se ha abordado 
todavía. En nuestro Primer Estudio replicamos resultados previos que muestran que la 
distracción desagradable afecta al mantenimiento de elementos no emocionales en MO 
(Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; 
Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). Sin embargo, los distractores agradables no produjeron 
mayores tasas de olvido que los neutros, como cabría esperar, ya que también 
representan una información muy importante para nuestra supervivencia (e.g. 
alimentos). Por tanto, si tanto los estímulos agradables como los desagradables son 
relevantes para la supervivencia y tienden a ser procesado de forma preferente 
(Armony & Dolan, 2002; Mogg et al., 1997; Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001), ¿por qué 
sólo los distractores desagradables funcionan como potentes interferencias en el 
mantenimiento de otros elementos en la memoria a corto plazo, mientras que los 
distractores agradables comportan como los neutros? En la sección de Discusión y 
conclusiones de ese Estudio argumentamos que la razón por la que estamos preparados 
para prestar atención y procesar profundamente los estímulos emocionales está 
relacionada probablemente con las posibles consecuencias de ignorar esos estímulos. 
Así, si no prestamos atención a un animal peligroso nuestra supervivencia se pone en 
peligro de forma inmediata. Sin embargo, si ignoramos los alimentos o los estímulos 
relacionados con la reproducción, nuestra supervivencia se verá comprometida en el 
medio o largo plazo. Por tanto, es razonable pensar que nuestro control ejecutivo puede 
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controlar por un momento la respuesta atencional provocada por los estímulos 
agradables, si estamos realizando otra tarea relevante, ya que nuestra supervivencia no 
se pone inmediatamente en riesgo (Ekman, 1992; Ohman, 1992). De esta manera, 
podemos beneficiarnos del resultado de realizar con éxito la tarea actual, sin 
comprometer nuestra supervivencia. Por el contrario, también es lógico que nuestro 
control inhibitorio sea bloqueado y no pueda controlar las respuestas atencionales 
provocadas por los estímulos desagradables, ya que esto podría poner en peligro 
inmediato nuestra supervivencia sólo por  un beneficio secundario potencial. Los análisis 
posteriores confirmaron esta idea, ya que la capacidad individual de resistencia a la 
interferencia en MO correlacionó positivamente con el rendimiento después de la 
distracción neutra y agradable, pero no después de la distracción desagradable. 
En lo que respecta a la actividad cerebral, varios estudios han proporcionado 
información sustancial sobre las regiones particulares del cerebro implicadas en el 
control cognitivo de la distracción emocional en MO (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 
2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013b, 2008, 2006; 
Iordan, Dolcos, Denkova, et al., 2013), mostrando que la distracción emocional 
desagradable puede producir una disminución de actividad en áreas del cerebro 
dorsales/ejecutivas mientras que aumenta la actividad en las regiones 
ventrales/emocionales corticales y subcorticales. Esta disociación se ha interpretado 
como un incremento de las influencias ascendentes desde las áreas 
ventrales/emocionales del cerebro hasta las regiones dorsales/ejecutivas, que reasigna 
los recursos atencionales perjudicando el rendimiento en MO (ver Dolcos et al., 2011 
para una revisión). Además, estos estudios han puesto de relieve las regiones 
específicas tanto en el sistema dorsal/ejecutivo como en el ventral/emocional, a saber, 
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la VLPFC y la DLPFC , que estarían críticamente involucradas en el control efectivo de la 
distracción emocional en MO (Anticevic et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 
2013a, 2006). 
En el Segundo Estudio exploramos la dinámica temporal de la actividad neuronal 
que sustenta nuestra capacidad de hacer frente a la distracción emocional, con el fin de 
comprender la naturaleza exacta de este proceso cognitivo altamente adaptativo. 
Nuestros resultados revelaron que mecanismos prefrontales se reclutan a latencias muy 
tempranas del procesamiento distractor, permitiendo la rápida detección de la 
distracción emocional agradable y desagradable. En etapas posteriores del 
procesamiento, los distractores desagradables iniciaban un mecanismo específico de 
control cognitivo dependiente de la actividad de la DLPFC, la MPFC y la OFC, para un 
control efectivo de la distracción. La especificidad de este mecanismo en la distracción 
desagradable coincide  con los resultados conductuales de nuestro primer estudio, ya 
que en aquél se obtuvieron mayores tasas de olvido para la distracción desagradable 
que para la distracción tanto neutra como agradable. Por lo tanto, es razonable pensar 
que necesitaríamos un mecanismo específico de control cognitivo de alto orden para 
anular la potente interferencia que supone la distracción desagradable. 
A pesar de la creciente evidencia sobre los mecanismos cerebrales que nos 
permiten hacer frente a la distracción emocional, muy pocos experimentos han 
investigado el efecto de este tipo de distracción en las redes cerebrales funcionales de la 
MO, a pesar de la reciente evidencia que sugiere que las conexiones funcionales de 
largo alcance entre la corteza frontal y las áreas posteriores son un mecanismo clave 
para el mantenimiento de la información en MO (Gazzaley, Rissman, & D’Esposito, 2004; 
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Palva, Monto, Kulashekhar, & Palva, 2010; Rissman, Gazzaley, & D’Esposito, 2004, 2008; 
Sarnthein, 1998; Sauseng, Klimesch, Schabus, & Doppelmayr, 2005). De hecho , sólo tres 
trabajos han aplicado métodos de conectividad funcional en este campo y todos ellos 
han limitado su análisis a las conexiones particulares entre la amígdala y la corteza 
prefrontal (Chuah et al., 2010; Clarke & Johnstone, 2013; Dolcos et al., 2006), dejando a 
un lado las redes corticales posteriores que sabemos participan en el mantenimiento en 
MO (e.g. Corbetta, Kincade, & Shulman, 2002; Todd & Marois, 2004). 
En el tercer estudio aplicamos un análisis de conectividad funcional a los datos 
recogidos en el segundo estudio con el fin de estudiar los posibles efectos de la 
distracción emocional en las redes corticales fronto-posteriores que han sido 
relacionadas con el mantenimiento activo de información en MO. Nuestros resultados 
mostraron que los estímulos emocionales producen una interrupción temprana y 
transitoria del componente parieto-temporal de la red fronto-posterior descrito 
anteriormente. Dicha interrupción se encontró en la misma latencia en el que se 
detectan los distractores emocionales, como se observó en el segundo estudio, lo que 
indica que esta detección temprana provoca inmediatamente una perturbación de la 
red fronto-posterior en Mo. Sin embargo, y de acuerdo con la literatura anterior (Clapp 
et al., 2010, 2011), dicha interrupción se restablecía para obtener un rendimiento 
conductual adecuado. Por otra parte, ambos distractores emocionales incrementaron el 
grado de acoplamiento funcional entre la VLPFC-OFC derecha y la corteza parieto-
temporal, a una latencia de procesamiento relativamente temprana. En el caso de la 
condición de distracción emocional desagradable, este acoplamiento también fue 
crucial para un buen rendimiento en MO y se acompañó de un mayor grado de 
acoplamiento entre el DLPFC y el PC. Este resultado en concreto, se observó 
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exclusivamente en la condición desagradable, siendo consistente con los resultados 
conductuales de nuestro primer estudio y la actividad cerebral obtenida en nuestro 
segundo estudio. De forma interesante, los resultados de este tercer estudio sugieren 
que el control cognitivo efectivo de la distracción emocional puede comenzar incluso 
antes de lo reportado en el segundo estudio, y que este mecanismo rápido y sutil podría 
basarse en el acoplamiento funcional de largo alcance. 
En resumen, la presente serie de estudios ha investigado por primera vez los 
mecanismos cognitivos de control de la distracción emocional, comenzando a un nivel 
conductual, explorando los perfiles espacio-temporales de la actividad cerebral y, 
finalmente, investigando los cambios dinámicos de las redes cerebrales funcionales que 
los sustentan. 
4. CONCLUSIONES GENERALES 
La presente serie de estudios demuestra que los estímulos desagradables afectan 
al mantenimiento de la información no-emocional cuando no son relevantes para la 
tarea en curso. Al mismo tiempo, estos estudios muestran por primera vez que la 
interferencia agradable no afecta necesariamente la MO, como lo hace la interferencia 
desagradable. Estos resultados indican que no todos los eventos emocionales pueden 
distraernos cuando estamos inmersos en una tarea relevante, ya que nuestro sistema 
cognitivo parece ser capaz de resistir los distractores agradables tan bien como los 
eventos no-emocionales. 
La relación entre el rendimiento en la tarea y la capacidad individual de 
resolución de interferencia en MO sugiere que la inmediatez de las consecuencias de 
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ignorar la información emocional irrelevante es el aspecto clave que permite o no a 
nuestro control ejecutivo anular la respuesta de atencional. En otras palabras, nuestro 
control cognitivo es capaz de inhibir nuestra tendencia a prestar atención a los 
acontecimientos agradables, ya que nuestra supervivencia no se verá comprometida 
inmediatamente. Sin embargo, no somos capaces de resistir la captura atencional 
provocada por eventos aversivos, ya que al hacerlo, pondremos en peligro nuestra 
supervivencia a muy corto plazo. 
Nuestra exploración de los mecanismos cerebrales implicados en el 
procesamiento de eventos emocionales irrelevantes muestra que la corteza prefrontal 
se activa a latencias muy tempranas del procesamiento del distractor, lo que permite la 
detección rápida de las distracciones emocionalmente agradables y desagradables. Sin 
embargo, estas áreas prefrontales están también involucradas en el control cognitivo de 
la distracción emocional, más tarde en el procesamiento. Curiosamente, el control de 
los eventos desagradables requiere de una mayor actividad en la DLPFC, la MPFC y la 
OFC, en concordancia con la mayor dificultad en el control de dichos eventos a nivel 
conductual. 
Hoy en día sabemos que el mantenimiento activo de información no es sólo el 
resultado de la actividad neuronal en regiones cerebrales concretas, sino que está 
sostenido por la actividad sincronizada de redes funcionales, ampliamente distribuidas 
por todo el cerebro. Nuestro análisis de conectividad funcional muestra que la detección 
temprana de la distracción emocional produce una interrupción transitoria de un 
importante centro de la red fronto-posterior que contribuye a sostener el 
mantenimiento de información en MO. A pesar de ello, la conectividad funcional entre 
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la corteza prefrontal y el OC se intensifica durante la detección temprana de distractores 
desagradables, ya que éstos contienen información potencialmente amenazante. 
En consonancia con nuestro análisis de la actividad regional, el control cognitivo 
de la distracción emocional se produce más tarde en el procesamiento. En este punto, la 
red fronto-posterior se restablece para lograr una ejecución adecuada, mientras que la 
CPFVL-OFC derecha y las cortezas posteriores se vuelven conectan fuertemente como 
mecanismo de control de la distracción emocional. 
En contra de la idea popular sobre el efecto de la emoción en la cognición, este 
trabajo revela por primera vez que cualquier tipo de información emocional no es capaz 
de afectar nuestra capacidad para mantenernos focalizados en asuntos importantes. 
Aunque la mayor parte de las veces podemos hacer frente a la mayoría de los 
distractores emocionales, los acontecimientos desagradables son más difíciles de 
controlar y afectan a nuestro rendimiento cognitivo con más frecuencia que los 
agradables o neutras. Nuestros resultados también ponen de manifiesto dos 
mecanismos diferentes que son la base de nuestra capacidad para resistir el efecto 
negativo de la distracción emocional. En primer lugar, tenemos que detectar la potencial 
importancia biológica de los eventos distractores, ya que estar preparado para 
procesarlos es altamente adaptativo. Este mecanismo se sustenta en la corteza 
prefrontal, aunque dicha detección temprana induce también una interrupción de la red 
cerebral funcional que sustenta la información relevante para la tarea en curso. Una vez 
detectada, la corteza prefrontal contribuye a controlar dicha distracción emocional por 
medio de una mayor actividad local, así como por medio de intensas conexiones 
funcionales con cortezas posteriores del cerebro.  
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5. LIMITACIONES Y LÍNEAS FUTURAS DE INVESTIGACIÓN 
En esta serie de estudios hemos explorado nuestra capacidad de hacer frente a 
los eventos emocionales que pueden distraernos mientras estamos manteniendo en 
mente información relevante, partiendo del nivel conductual hasta llegar a las bases 
neurales de dicha capacidad, ya sea usando un enfoque tradicional basado en 
activaciones cerebrales regionales o una metodología más innovadora que permite 
estudiar cómo áreas distantes del cerebro trabajan juntas. A pesar de los resultados 
obtenidos en los diferentes niveles de análisis, todavía hay algunas cuestiones 
relevantes que la investigación futura debería abordar. 
Nuestro primer estudio se basó en el concepto de atención motivada, y por lo 
tanto, asumimos que ambos tipos de estímulos emocionales reclutarían recursos 
atencionales en un mismo grado. Sin embargo, es posible que las diferencias entre los 
distractores agradables y desagradables se debieran a diferencias en la captura 
atencional que producen. Esta hipótesis podría ser sometida a prueba si los voluntarios 
procesaran cada tipo de distractor con la misma profundidad. Para lograr este objetivo, 
podría pedirse a los participantes que evalúen algunos aspectos de los distractores, por 
ejemplo, si la escena representada en la imagen se lleva a cabo en interiores o al aire 
libre. Si los voluntarios llevan a cabo esta tarea secundaria igualmente bien en todos los  
tipos de distracción, podríamos estar seguros de que están prestando atención por igual 
a todos los distractores y por tanto, las diferencias entre condiciones no podrían 
atribuirse a las diferencias en captura atencional. 
En el segundo estudio, utilizamos un análisis de correlación para explorar la 
relación entre la actividad cerebral y la conducta. Aunque se trata de una estrategia 
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común, la manera más robusta de abordar este problema habría consistido en comparar 
la actividad cerebral durante los aciertos y los fallos. Sin embargo, el número limitado de 
ensayos de error en nuestro experimento nos impidió la reconstrucción de fuentes para 
los datos correspondientes. Investigaciones futuras deberían aumentar el número total 
de ensayos para tratar de obtener datos suficientes a partir de los errores. 
Por último, en nuestro Tercer Estudio, exploramos la conectividad funcional a 
larga distancia en una banda de frecuencias ancha. Dado que éste es el primer estudio 
que explora las dinámicas de conectividad funcional que sustentan nuestra capacidad 
para hacer frente a la distracción emocional, decidimos centrarnos en las tres ventanas 
temporales en las que surgieron diferencias significativas entre los distintos tipos de 
distractores, a nivel de la actividad cerebral. Así pues, decidimos también usar el mismo 
rango de frecuencias que en el Segundo Estudio, con el fin de mantener consistentes 
ambos análisis. Sin embargo, cada vez más evidencia sugiere que bandas de frecuencia 
específicas, p.e. la banda alfa, pueden estar fuertemente relacionadas con los procesos 
inhibitorios que se suponen involucrados en nuestra capacidad para hacer frente a 
cualquier tipo de evento distractor. Estudios futuros deberían analizar las diferentes 
bandas de frecuencia para desvelar la contribución potencial de cada ritmo a nuestra 
capacidad de controlar la distracción emocional. 
 
  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
   
Emotion and cognition are two primary concepts in human mental life that are 
understood as distinct though profusely interrelated (Dalgleish & Power, 1999; Paul 
Ekman & Davidson, 1994; Martin & Clore, 2001). These rich interactions have 
traditionally brought about a vivid interest in cognitive psychology, in such a way that 
specific areas of study such as bonds between memory and emotion, have been object 
of an intense research (e.g. Banich et al., 2009; Christianson, 1992; LeDoux, 1994; 
Reisberg & Hertel, 2004).  
Interactions between memory and emotion are especially intriguing, as they give 
rise to different consequences depending on whether the emotion is relevant for the 
ongoing task or not. Under the concept of “motivated attention” proposed by Peter J. 
Lang and colleagues  (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998; Lang et al., 1993), emotional 
stimuli represent information that is intensely linked to the survival of the organism, like 
food or predators (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; LeDoux, 1996; Ohman et al., 2000). For 
this reason, emotional information have preferential access to our cognitive system and 
recruit attentional resources that improve our preparation to process such biologically 
relevant information (Armony & Dolan, 2002; Bradley et al., 2003; Lang, Bradley, 
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Fitzsimmons, et al., 1998; Mogg et al., 1997; Morris et al., 1998; Ohman et al., 2000; 
Sabatinelli et al., 2005). When talking about memory, this phenomenon tends to make 
emotional information more resistant to forgetting, since it is highly adaptive to 
remember where the biggest fruits grow up and what animals are the most dangerous. 
In the laboratory, much psychological research has demonstrated that emotional 
information is better remembered that non-emotional information (Canli et al., 2000; 
Dietrich et al., 2001; E. B. Jones et al., 1987; Kensinger, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2000; 
Schmidt & Williams, 2001) but, what happens when the emotional information is not 
relevant for the particular business in which you are involved? In such circumstances, 
our natural predisposition to deeply process the emotional information turns these 
elements into strong interferences that compete with the actual relevant information 
and provoke a worsening in the performance of the current task (Anticevic et al., 2010; 
Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006).  
To our knowledge, not many studies have explored the detrimental effect of 
emotional stimuli on the maintenance of non-emotional information in short-term 
memory. The most usual approach has leant on delayed-recognition working memory 
(WM) paradigms, in which participants have to memorize different types of non-
emotional materials and maintain them in memory while emotional stimuli are 
presented (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & 
McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013a, 2008, 2006; Iordan, Dolcos, Denkova, et al., 2013; 
Oei et al., 2011). The general finding shows that unpleasant emotional distractors may 
affect the maintenance of non-emotional elements in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah 
et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Oei et al., 2011), which would be in accordance 
with the idea previously introduced: if a stimulus for which we are biologically 
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predetermined to not ignore (i.e. emotional stimuli) is presented within a WM task, it 
will work as a powerful interference and will impair the recovery of relevant information 
more than other non-emotional interferences. However, some other studies have not 
showed such a detrimental effect in their whole samples, but only in subsets of 
participants (Dolcos et al., 2008; Iordan, Dolcos, & Dolcos, 2013) or in trials in which 
their volunteers were more confident about their response (Denkova et al., 2010). 
These discrepancies have been ascribed to individual differences in attentional 
impulsiveness (Dolcos et al., 2008) and in emotional processing (Denkova et al., 2010), 
although potential differences in general cognitive control mechanisms that might 
account for such differences has not been assessed yet. 
Following the rationale that posit that emotional stimuli work as powerful 
interferences because they represent biologically relevant information, pleasant 
emotional stimuli would also produce equivalent levels of interference in WM. Indeed, 
some authors have suggested that higher levels of arousal in the stimulus, regardless of 
whether it is pleasant or unpleasant, can recruit more attentional resources (de Oca et 
al., 2012; Lang, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, et al., 1998) than neutral elements. However, the 
actual effect of positively valenced emotional distractors in WM maintenance has not 
been addressed and it remains unexplored. 
Over the last decade, several neuroimaging studies have used functional 
Magnetic Resonance (fMRI) to explore the neural mechanisms that underlie the 
cognitive control of emotional distraction. A significant part of these experiments have 
identified a dissociable pattern of activity between the dorsal surface of the brain, 
including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the lateral parietal cortex (LPC), 
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traditionally been related to executive functioning and WM (Berryhill & Olson, 2008; 
D’Esposito et al., 2000; Derrfuss et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2009; Nee et al., 2013; Smith 
& Jonides, 1999), and ventral brain areas, including the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), the occipitotemporal cortex (OTC) and the 
amygdala, traditionally involved in emotional processing and emotional regulation 
(Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012; Phan et al., 2002). 
Unpleasant distractors seems to decrease the brain activity over dorsal/executive brain 
areas while, simultaneously, increases activity in ventral/emotional regions.  In short, 
unpleasant distractors seem to enhance bottom-up influences from ventral/emotional 
to dorsal/executive brain areas, reallocating attentional processes in favor of emotional 
stimuli and deploying WM performance (see Dolcos et al., 2011 for a review). 
Nevertheless, cognition and more specifically WM, is not consistently depleted 
by every single emotional distractor, in such a way that our cognitive system must have 
control mechanisms for overriding emotional the interference. Indeed, specific regions 
over both the ventral/emotional and the dorsal/executive dissociable systems, i.e. the 
VLPFC and DLPFC  have been found critically involved in successful coping with 
emotional distraction in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 
2013a, 2006). 
Whereas the neuroscientific literature in this field has provided substantial 
information about the particular brain regions involved in the cognitive control of 
emotional distraction in WM, the temporal dynamics of such neural activity has not 
been explored, though this approach would surely provide valuable information about 
the exact nature of cognitive process. 
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On the other hand, nowadays it is widely accepted that the human brain does 
not work as a modular system, in which every single function is relatively well located in 
a specific sector. Furthermore, the our complex behavior emerges from the integrative 
functioning of complex and dynamic networks widely distributed across the brain (see 
Sporns, 2011 for a comprehensive intoduction to the concept of brain networks).  
Active maintenance of information has been described as a result of 
synchronized and sustained activity within local groups of neurons and over functional 
networks widely distributed across the brain (Fuster & Alexander, 1971; Goldman-Rakic, 
1990; Miller, 1996). In particular, recent studies have pointed out to long-range 
functional coupling between frontal and posterior areas as the key mechanism for 
maintaining information in WM (Gazzaley et al., 2004; Palva et al., 2010; Rissman et al., 
2004, 2008; Sarnthein, 1998; Sauseng et al., 2005).  
Several studies have explored the effect of non-emotional distraction on 
functional brain networks of WM by focusing on the prefrontal cortex and the posterior 
areas of the brain. Such approach is based on extensive literature that links the fronto-
parietal cortex to active maintenance processes in WM (e.g. Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; 
Pessoa, Gutierrez, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2002; Rowe, Toni, Josephs, Frackowiak, & 
Passingham, 2000), and occipito-temporal areas to the formation of sensory 
representation in visual WM (e.g. Desimone, 1998; Fuster, 1990; Miyashita, 2000). 
Following this procedure, recent studies have described interference-based 
disturbances in the functional coupling between the prefrontal cortex and the posterior 
sensory cortex, and that such disturbances can be restored after the presentation of the 
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interfering stimulus for a successful WM performance (Clapp et al., 2010, 2011; Yoon et 
al., 2006). 
Despite of these evidences, very few papers have applied functional connectivity 
measures to the study of the brain dynamics involved in overriding emotional 
distraction, and all of them have limited their analysis to the particular connections 
between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex (Chuah et al., 2010; Clarke & 
Johnstone, 2013; Dolcos et al., 2006), leaving aside posterior cortical networks known to 
be engaged in WM maintenance (e.g. Corbetta, Kincade, & Shulman, 2002; Todd & 
Marois, 2004). 
The aim of the present series of studies is to contribute to fill in the gaps of the 
existent literature in regard with the cognitive control of emotional distraction in WM. 
To accomplish such objective we first proceeded with two behavioral experiments with 
the intention of replicate previous results, explore the effect of the pleasant stimuli as 
distractors and clarify the role of individual differences in cognitive control mechanisms 
of overriding emotional distraction in WM. In a further study, we used 
Magnetoencephalography (MEG) to investigate the spatio-temporal dynamics of the 
brain mechanisms that allow us to cope with both pleasant and unpleasant emotional 
distraction. Finally, we applied functional connectivity measures to analyze the 
dynamics of the functional brain networks that support the cognitive processes that 
actively maintain information in WM, in the context of emotional distraction. 
 
  GENERAL OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESIS
   
1. FIRST STUDY 
In this study we designed a WM task in which neutral faces were task-relevant 
items and emotional and non-emotional pictures were task-irrelevant distractors, in 
order to explore the effect of both pleasant and unpleasant distractors in WM 
maintenance. If detrimental effects of unpleasant distraction were due to the biological 
relevance of emotional stimuli and our natural predisposition to deeply process them, 
other kind of biologically relevant stimuli such as pleasant ones, should affect 
performance in a similar way. We also studied the potential effect of emotional and 
non-emotional distraction in comparison with a non-interference scenario, by adding a 
fourth condition to the original design, in which no stimulus was presented during the 
maintenance of task-relevant information. Finally, we measured the individual capacity 
of inhibitory control in memory, by using a standardized neuropsychological test. If 
cognitive inhibition and interference resolution are the key processes involved in control 
of distraction, participants with higher scores in this capacity will show higher accuracy 
and faster reaction times at the recognition stage. 
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2. SECOND STUDY 
In the Second Study we used a very similar WM task to that employed in the First 
Study, and implemented it in a MEG experiment. The principal objective of this study 
was to unravel the spatio-temporal profiles of the brain activity that underlies the 
cognitive control mechanisms involved in coping with emotional distraction. Based on 
previous evidence showing an early processing of emotional stimuli (Batty & Taylor, 
2003; Bradley et al., 2003; Carretié et al., 2004; Pourtois et al., 2005), we predict that 
emotional stimuli would increase the brain response at early latencies of distraction 
processing. Since such an early activation have been reported in perceptual task, in 
which the emotional stimuli do not have to be controlled, we also hypothesize that the 
effective overriding of emotional distractors would occur later in the processing, and 
that such cognitive control would be mediated by higher activation prefrontal cortices. 
Finally, and based on results from the First Study we posit that differences between the 
cognitive control of unpleasant and pleasant distraction would appear at the brain 
activity level. 
3. THIRD STUDY 
In the Third Study we applied a functional connectivity analysis to the data 
collected in the Second Study in order to determine the potential effect of the 
emotional distraction on the dynamics of functional connectivity that have been 
observed in WM maintenance. Based on the existent literature showing that non-
emotional disruption can transiently disrupt fronto-posterior connections (Clapp et al., 
2010, 2011; Yoon et al., 2006) we expect that such network would be more disrupted by 
emotional distractors than by neutral ones. According with the extensive literature that 
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links the VLPFC to the successful coping with emotional distraction (Denkova et al., 
2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013, 2006; Iordan et al., 2013) we also 
hypothesize that this prefrontal region would be highly coupled with posterior areas. 
  FIRST STUDY 
 Emotional interference-based forgetting in short-
term memory. Cognitive inhibition of pleasant but not 
unpleasant biologically relevant distractors 
   
1. INTRODUCTION  
Do you remember any situation in which you felt that your memory was 
disrupted by an emotional event while trying to keep in mind some relevant 
information? Imagine for example, that you are in a cafe with a friend, having a 
conversation. At some point, a car collides with a traffic light out in the street. Right 
after the initial fright you would probably say: “What were we talking about?” That is, 
you would have forgotten necessary information to pick the talk up. 
The effect of emotion on our cognition and behavior is an issue widely addressed 
by the psychological literature. The wealthy interactions between these “hot” and 
“cold” systems have attracted widespread attention. In particular, interactions between 
memory and emotion are especially interesting because of the opposed consequences 
resulting from emotional information being a relevant part of the current activity (Canli 
et al., 2000), contrary to when emotional facts are irrelevant for the ongoing task. 
Emotional stimuli automatically fall into the focus of our attention (Armony & Dolan, 
2002; Mogg et al., 1997; Ohman et al., 2001). Such an effect is explained by the 
biological relevance of emotional stimuli, since they contain information that is 
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important for survival (e.g. food or predators) (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; LeDoux, 1996; 
Ohman et al., 2000). The concept of “motivated attention” (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
1998; Lang et al., 1993) proposes that emotional information seems to have a privileged 
access to our cognitive system, recruiting attentional resources automatically and 
improving our preparation to process them (Bradley et al., 2003; Lang, Bradley, 
Fitzsimmons, et al., 1998; Morris et al., 1998; Sabatinelli et al., 2005). This phenomenon 
usually brings about more adaptive responses since we can easily and accurately 
remember crucial information for survival. Many laboratory studies have reported 
enhanced memory for emotional pictures (Canli et al., 2000), emotional word-lists 
(Dietrich et al., 2001; E. B. Jones et al., 1987) or memory for humor (Schmidt & Williams, 
2001). However, there are other situations in which the most adaptive behavior consists 
precisely in ignoring emotional information, for example to accomplish a more 
immediate goal. It is in these circumstances when the biological salience of emotional 
stimuli and our natural predisposition to deeply process them turn them into powerful 
interferences that compete with relevant information for cognitive resources (Ellis & 
Ashbrook, 1988). This finally results in a worsening of performance of the current task 
(Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; 
Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). 
Detrimental effects of emotional interference on working memory (WM) for non-
emotional materials provide an opportunity to explore limits of cognitive inhibition in 
memory control. The impact of non-emotional interference in WM has been largely 
explored, leading to several interpretations about the interference-based forgetting in 
short-term memory, such as process-based interference (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & 
Camos, 2004; Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 1998), interference by superposition (Farrell & 
First Study     39 
Lewandowsky, 2002), interference by feature overwriting (Nairne, 1990; Oberauer & 
Kliegl, 2006) and interference by retrieval confusion (Wixted, 2004). However, there is 
no much information about how cognitive inhibition helps us to ignore stimuli for which 
evolution has prepared us to pay attention to, in the context of WM. 
To our knowledge, few studies have addressed the issue of interference-based 
forgetting in short-term memory due to the appearance of emotional distractors during 
the maintenance of non-emotional information. Dolcos and colleagues have conducted 
a series of studies using several modifications of the same WM task, developed for fMRI 
experiments. In an early study (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006), they used a delayed-
recognition WM task with sets of three human faces as items to be memorized and 
pictures depicting unpleasant emotional scenes, pictures depicting neutral scenes and 
digitally scrambled versions of these pictures as distractors presented during the delay 
interval. The worst recognition scores were associated with the appearance of 
unpleasant distractors. Accuracy was also lower for neutral than for scrambled 
distractors. These results seem to be in accordance with interference-based forgetting 
theories (Berman, Jonides, & Lewis, 2009) since the introduction of both emotional and 
non-emotional irrelevant information during the maintenance stage of a WM memory 
task impaired the recovery of relevant information in comparison with introduction of a 
colored picture without any meaning, which could be considered a non-interference 
condition. In addition, these results seem to confirm the idea previously introduced: if a 
stimulus for which we are biologically predetermined to not ignore (i.e. emotional 
stimuli) is presented within a WM task, it will work as a powerful interference impairing 
the recovery of relevant information more than other non-emotional interference. 
However, in a later study using a similar task (Dolcos et al., 2008), they did not find any 
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behavioral effect.  Further exploration identified a subgroup of participants who seem 
to profit from emotional interference.  Dolcos and cols. ascribed this opposing 
behavioral effect to individual differences. Nevertheless, the effect of both emotional 
and non-emotional distractions compared with non-interference scenario, was not 
addressed since they did not include a non-interference condition. Other studies from 
this group developed to investigate the effect of sleep deprivation (Chuah et al., 2010) 
and the effect of anxiety-induced distraction (Denkova et al., 2010) have replicated the 
main effect of impaired WM after unpleasant distraction. However, they did not find 
differences in performance after neutral distraction and no distraction.  
Anticevic and cols. (2010) addressed this issue in a delayed-recognition WM task 
using complex geometric shapes as relevant items to memorize and recognize. During 
the maintenance stage, three types of distractors were presented: unpleasant 
emotional pictures, neutral pictures and task related geometric shapes. A fourth 
condition was added as non-interference, in which no distractor was introduced. The 
authors also manipulated the difficulty of the task by including low WM load trials and 
high WM load trials, in which two or four geometric shapes were presented at the 
encoding stage, respectively. Consistent with previous work (Chuah et al., 2010; 
Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006), unpleasant distractors were associated 
with worsening of accuracy compared with neutral distraction in low WM load trials.  
Surprisingly, no differences appeared in high WM load and accuracy for non-
interference condition was lower than for all distraction conditions. The authors 
explained this unexpected pattern as an artifact of their experimental design. All the 
conditions were pseudo-randomly presented so that no experimental condition 
appeared during more than three consecutive trials. This made distraction trials much 
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more common than free-distraction trials and therefore volunteers may have been 
surprised by the recognition stimulus on the non-interference trials. This hypothesis was 
supported by additional data using the same task but in which free-distraction trials 
were presented in a separate block, instead of intermixed with distraction trials 
(Anticevic et al., 2010). Using this blocked design, performance after non-interference 
was substantially better than after distraction conditions which is consistent with 
previous findings (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). 
Hence, results from different studies from several groups suggest that 
unpleasant emotional irrelevant stimuli seems to worsen the maintenance of neutral 
relevant information in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Dolcos & 
McCarthy, 2006), although this effect might be not very consistent as in some other 
studies it has been found only in a subset of participants (Dolcos et al., 2008) or only 
within the most confident responses (Denkova et al., 2010). However, the effect of 
pleasant emotional interference in WM is still an open issue. Some authors have 
pointed out that stimuli with higher levels of arousal could recruit more attentional 
resources (Lang, Bradley, Fitzsimmons, et al., 1998), leading to worsening of 
performance when those stimuli are not relevant for the ongoing task. But, has the 
affective valence of those high arousing stimuli any influence on their power as 
distractors? Exploring the effect of both, pleasant and unpleasant interference in 
comparison with neutral interference might provide us with valuable information about 
the mechanisms that turn this type of stimuli out into powerful sources of interference.  
Apart from that, the extent to which emotionally neutral stimuli disrupt WM 
maintenance, in comparison to a non-interference scenario, has not been completely 
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clarified. In other words, might subjects be able to completely ignore neutral 
distractors? Dolcos and McCarthy 2006) and Anticevic et al. (2010) found poorer 
performance during neutral distraction compared with non-interference, while other 
studies failed to replicate this difference (Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010). This 
inconsistency might be explained by individual differences in executive control of 
distraction. Thus, people with higher capacity of interference resolution could perform 
WM tasks with neutral interference as well as without any interference, while 
performance of people with lower capacity of interference resolution might be affected 
by the appearance of neutral distractors. Considering individual differences in the ability 
to control interference might probably help to clarify the effect of neutral distraction 
with respect to non-interference scenario.  
In two experiments we tried to address these open questions using a WM task in 
which neutral faces were task-relevant items and emotional and non-emotional pictures 
were task-irrelevant distractors. In the first experiment we explored the mechanisms 
that turn emotional stimuli out into powerful sources of interference. To do this, we 
included three experimental conditions in which pleasant, neutral and unpleasant 
pictures were displayed as interference during the maintenance stage of the WM task. 
We aimed to verify whether pleasant interference has any detrimental effect. Thus, 
contributions of both valence and arousal dimensions were investigated. In the second 
experiment, we further explored potential differences in the effect of emotional and 
non-emotional interference in comparison to non-interference scenario, by adding a 
fourth condition to the original design, in which no stimulus was presented during the 
maintenance of task-relevant information. Moreover, we measured the individual 
capacity of inhibitory control over memory using a standardized neuropsychological test 
First Study     43 
in both experiments. These data served to examine whether individual differences in 
this ability influence coping with emotional interference in WM. 
2. EXPERIMENT 1  
In the first experiment, we explored the effect of two valence emotional 
distractors, pleasant, unpleasant, as well as the effect of neutral distraction in WM 
maintenance. If detrimental effects of unpleasant distraction were due to the biological 
relevance of emotional stimuli and our natural predisposition to deeply process them, 
other kind of biologically relevant stimuli such as pleasant ones, should affect 
performance in a similar way. If this was the case, the worsening of performance by 
emotional distraction would seem to be mainly arousal-driven. Indeed, taking into 
account that pleasant stimuli are usually more arousing than neutral ones, but less 
arousing than unpleasant stimuli, performance after pleasant distraction should be 
better than after unpleasant distraction, but worse than after neutral distraction. 
We also tried to relate individual cognitive inhibition capacities to performance in 
each experimental condition. If cognitive inhibition and interference resolution are the 
key processes involved in control of distraction, participants with higher scores in this 
capacity will show higher accuracy and faster reaction times at the recognition stage. 
2.1. METHOD  
2.1.1.  Participants  
Participants were 30 students from the Complutense University of Madrid and 
the Camilo José Cela University of Madrid (mean age 21 year and a range between 18 
and 35 years). They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Half of the participants 
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were females (18-35 years old and a mean age of 19.46 years) and half of them were 
males (18-34 years old and a mean age of 22.66 years).  
 Age STAI-S STAI-T BDI 
TAVEC 
List A 
TAVEC 
List B 
TAVEC 
Short term 
Interference 
Resolution 
Exp. 1  
Mean 21,06 16,50 17,33 5,40 13,4 6,03 12,10 1,30 
SD 5,00 8,26 8,50 4,28 1,92 1,71 2,50 1,39 
 
Exp. 2 
 
Mean 21,69 15,41 16,86 6,81 7,25 6,06 5,18 -2,06 
SD 4,48 6,07 8,76 5,66 1,66 1,72 2,08 1,35 
Table 1. Volunteer’s demographic information in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. STAI-
S: Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults - State score; STAI-S: Spielberger 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults - Trait score; BDI: Beck Depression Inventory; 
TAVEC List A: Number of items successfully recalled at the first immediate recall of List 
A; TAVEC List B: Number of items successfully recalled at the first immediate recall of 
Interference list or List B; TAVEC Short term: Number of items successfully recalled at 
the short delay free recall of List A; Interference Resolution: Score at TAVEC Short term 
minus score at TAVEC List A. Scores below zero represent loss of information due to 
interference, or low interference resolution in WM, while scores equal-to or over zero 
represent no loss of information after the interference, or high interference resolution 
in WM. 
They all completed the Spanish version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory for Adults (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 2002), the Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 2006) and the España-Complutense Verbal Learning 
Test (TAVEC), a Spanish version of the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT) (Benedet & 
Alexandre, 1998) (see Table 1 for demographic information). Participants received 
course credits for their time.  
2.1.2. Materials  
Items at encoding and recognition stages consisted of colored images of neutral 
faces. An oval mask was applied along the contours of the faces to remove ears and hair 
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and avoid any potential non-face specific cues. A pair of faces was presented at the 
encoding stage while just one face was displayed at the recognition stage. Faces were 
counterbalanced across experimental conditions. For the interfering items presented at 
the maintenance period, 90 pictures from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) were selected and matched in luminance, 
contrast, color and figure-ground relationships.  
Condition IAPS Valence IAPS Arousal Subjective Valence 
Subjective 
Arousal 
Experiment 1  
Pleasant 7,33 (0,33) 5,84 (0,33) 7,14 (0,52) 5,35 (1,20) 
Neutral 4,91 (0,35) 2,77 (0,35) 5,09 (0,52) 2,27 (0,50) 
Unpleasant 2,29 (0,70) 6,54 (0,70) 2,23 (0,82) 6,48 (0,48) 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Pleasant 7,34 (0,32) 6,23 (0,53) 7,09 (0,46) 5,40 (1,01) 
Neutral 4,91 (0,35) 2,77 (0,38) 5,09 (0,55) 1,92 (0,66) 
Unpleasant 2,39 (0,67) 6,23 (0,56) 2,37 (0,97) 6,71 (0,91) 
Table 2. Mean normative values of pictures used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 and 
mean subjective ratings of those pictures by our volunteers. Standard deviations are 
shown in parenthesis.  
They were divided in tree experimental sets according to their normative valence 
and arousal ratings: pleasant, neutral and unpleasant pictures (see Table 2 for mean 
normative values). 
2.1.3.  Procedure  
A delayed-recognition WM paradigm with three experimental conditions, 
pleasant, neutral and unpleasant interference was used. Each condition comprised 30 
trials. Each trial began with a 1000 ms intertrial interval (ITI), followed by the 
presentation of a pair of faces for 2000 ms (encoding phase). After a 1000 ms blank 
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screen, an interfering stimulus was displayed for 2000 ms, followed by another 1000 ms 
blank screen (maintenance phase). Next, just one face appeared on the screen for 1500 
ms, followed by a 500 ms blank screen (recognition stage). Participants had to decide 
whether the face at the recognition stage has been one of the two previously encoded 
or not, by pressing one of two keys (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Diagram of the delayed-recognition WM paradigm in Experiment 1 and the 
Second Study. Three types of distractors (pleasant, neutral and unpleasant) were 
pseudorandomly presented during the maintenance stage. Volunteers were trained to 
learn and maintain the pair of faces into WM, look at the distracter, and then decide 
whether the face at the recognition stage is one of the two previously encoded or not, 
by pressing one of two keys. 
Before the experiment, all the volunteers underwent four training trials in order 
to ensure that they completely understood the task. To avoid inducing long-lasting 
mood states, the order of trials were constrained so that no more than three trials of 
the same condition were consecutively presented. Once the WM paradigm was 
completed, all the pictures used as interference were presented to the participants and 
they were asked to rate them regarding emotional valence and arousal, using the Self-
Assessment Manikin (SAM) self-report scale (Lang, 1980). Participants were allowed to 
see each picture as long as they wanted, and the order of presentation of the pictures 
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was also constrained in the same way, but in a different sequence, than for the WM 
task. 
2.2. RESULTS  
2.2.1.  Accuracy  
Figure 2a plots the mean accuracy (hits and correct rejections) for each condition 
averaged across subjects. A one-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
revealed a significant main effect of condition [F(2, 28)=14.32, p<.0001, eta 
squared=.50]. Pairwise comparisons using the Bonferroni correction revealed a lower 
performance during unpleasant interference compared to pleasant (p<.001) and neutral 
interference (p<.0001). There was no differences between pleasant and neutral 
interference (p>0.1). 
2.2.2.  Reaction times  
Figure 2b shows the mean reaction times for correctly recognized items for each 
condition. Results from one-way repeated-measures ANOVA yielded a main effect of 
condition [F(2, 28)=11.87, p<.0001, eta squared=.45]. Pairwise comparisons using the 
Bonferroni correction revealed slower performance during unpleasant interference 
compared to pleasant (p<.0001) and neutral interference (p<.007). No differences were 
found between pleasant and neutral interference (p=1.00). 
2.2.3. Subjective emotional ratings  
As expected, subjective valence ratings differed as a function of affective 
category [F(2,28)=284.85, p<.0001, eta squared=.95], with pleasant pictures rated as 
most pleasant followed by neutral pictures, and unpleasant pictures rated as least 
pleasant [mean valence ratings: 7.14, sd=0.52 (pleasant), 5.09, sd=0.52 (neutral), 2.23, 
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sd=0.82 (unpleasant), p<.0001 for all comparisons]. Arousal ratings also varied as a 
function of affective category [F(2,28)=139.47, p<.0001, eta squared=.90], with pleasant 
and unpleasant pictures rated as more arousing than neutral pictures [mean arousal 
ratings: 5.35, sd=1.20 (pleasant), 2.27, sd=0.5 (neutral), 6.48, sd=0.48 (unpleasant), 
p<.0001 for both comparisons]. Unpleasant pictures were rated as more arousing than 
pleasant pictures (p<.001) (see Table 2 for mean subjective values).  
 
Figure 2. A: Mean accuracy (expressed as percent correct) in Experiment 1. Unpleasant 
distractors caused a detrimental effect on WM accuracy, compared to neutral and 
pleasant distractors (**p<.0001). B: Mean reaction times for accurate recognitions in 
Experiment 1. Unpleasant distractors caused a slower performance on WM, compared 
to neutral and pleasant distractors (* p<.05; **p<.0001). Error bars represent standard 
error of mean. 
2.2.4.  Interference resolution in WM and performance  
To test the relationship between individual inhibitory control and performance, 
results from TAVEC were used to develop an interference resolution measurement in 
WM. As in the CVLT, in the TAVEC, a list of items to memorize (list A) is presented and 
recalled five times before the presentation and recall of the interference list (list B). 
Then participants are asked to recall again as many items from list A as they can (post-
interference recall of list A). Interference resolution scores were calculated by 
subtracting the amount of items successfully remembered at the first immediate recall 
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of list A from the amount of items successfully remembered at the post-interference 
recall of list A. Thus, scores below zero represent loss of information due to 
interference, or low interference resolution ability, while scores equal-to or over zero 
represent no loss of information after the interference, or high interference resolution 
ability. No significant correlations were found between interference resolution in WM 
and accuracy or reaction times for any experimental condition (see Table 3 for 
correlation coefficients and significance values).  
Interference 
resolution 
Accuracy Reaction times 
Pleasant Neutral Unpleasant Pleasant Neutral Unpleasant 
Rs -.07 .04 -.22 -.14 -.12 -.15 
Sig. (one-tailed) .34 .41 .11 .22 .25 .20 
Table 3. Spearman’s correlation coefficients between individual interference resolution 
in WM and performance during the delayed-recognition WM task. 
2.2.5. Item analysis  
To test the relationship between the emotional features of pictures and their 
value as interference during the WM task, we calculated the correlation between their 
valence and arousal subjective ratings, and accurate recognition likelihood and reaction 
times for each trials in which they appeared as distractors. Valence correlated positively 
with accuracy (one-tailed Spearman’s Rho=.22, p<.05) and negatively with reaction time 
(one-tailed Spearman’s Rho=-.37, p<.0001), while arousal correlated positively with 
reaction time (one-tailed Spearman’s Rho=.22, p<.05), and tended to negatively 
correlate with accuracy (one-tailed Spearman’s Rho=-.26, p=.06). Since both pleasant 
and unpleasant stimuli were high arousing, partial correlations were calculated in order 
to test whether one of them was leading the correlation effect. Valence correlated 
positively with accuracy (one-tailed ρvalence, accuracy ∙ arousal=.21, p<.05) and 
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negatively with reaction time (one-tailed ρvalence, accuracy ∙ arousal=-.30, p<.005) 
when the effect of arousal was controlled. No significant correlation was found between 
arousal and accuracy (one-tailed ρvalence, accuracy ∙ arousal=-.12, p>.1) nor arousal and 
reaction time (one-tailed ρvalence, accuracy ∙ arousal=.11, p>.1) when the effect of 
valence was controlled. 
2.3. DISCUSSION  
One of the major aims of this first experiment was to clarify previous results 
suggesting that unpleasant emotional stimuli disrupt WM maintenance of non-
emotional information more than other neutral stimuli. In accordance to the literature 
(Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; 
Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006) unpleasant interference does affect WM more than neutral 
interference, resulting in enhanced forgetting in short-term memory. Analysis of 
reaction times for correct responses also showed this pattern, with slower responses 
after unpleasant interference than after neutral interference. This suggests that 
unpleasant interference not only increases the probability of forgetting but produces 
higher cognitive costs even for successful performance. This effect may be explained 
under the concept of motivated attention (Bradley et al., 2003) which refers to the 
automatic capture of attentional resources by stimuli which represent information 
linked to survival. As posed above, this capture of attentional resources means an 
advantage when emotion is task relevant, since it drives a deeper processing of those 
stimuli (Bradley et al., 2003). However, when emotion is not part of goal-task relevant 
information, this attentional capture turns emotional stimuli into powerful competitors 
which interfere with relevant information. This finally worsens performance of the 
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ongoing task (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et 
al., 2008; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). 
A second major aim of this experiment was to test whether pleasant emotional 
interference affect WM in a similar manner than unpleasant interference does. If we 
assume that emotional features of stimuli are key contributors to turn them into 
powerful interferences, pleasant stimuli, which also represent important information for 
survival, such as food or reproduction, should also recruit attentional resources, and 
therefore produce similar amount of forgetting. Unexpectedly, pleasant interference 
does not affect maintenance of information in WM more than neutral interference. 
These results suggest that, contrary to our initial hypothesis, the power of emotional 
stimuli as interference in WM is not only arousal-driven. If this were the case, pleasant 
distractors would have produced lower WM performance than neutral interference, but 
higher WM performance than unpleasant distraction. As this is not the case, the valence 
of emotional stimuli must have any contribution to the value of emotional stimuli as 
interference. Partial correlation analysis from our data confirmed this hypothesis. 
Valence correlated significantly with performance when the effect of arousal was 
controlled, so that the more unpleasant was the distractor the higher probability of 
forgetting information previously encoding, and the higher cognitive cost of giving a 
correct response, as reflected by reaction time. 
Although this unexpected finding seems to partially contradict the hypothesis of 
biological relevance-based interference, a more thorough interpretation may clarify this 
issue. The reason that accounts for the salience of emotional stimuli is probably related 
to the potential consequences of ignoring them. If one do not pay attention to a 
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dangerous animal or to some food, our probability of surviving decreases. This probably 
explains why we are prepared to pay attention to and deeply process such stimuli. 
Nevertheless, consequences of ignoring pleasant and unpleasant stimuli, although 
critical for survival, differ in the immediate outcome of this behavior.  Undoubtedly, 
medium to long-term survival or gene transfer to the next generation can be 
compromised when food or reproduction related stimuli are ignored. However, short-
term surviving probability decreases when potentially dangerous cues are ignored. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable that our executive control, specifically our inhibitory 
control, can override the attentional response elicited by a pleasant stimulus for a 
moment, if we are performing another relevant task, since our survival is not 
immediately at risk (Ekman, 1992; Ohman, 1992).  
Finally, we tried to relate individual differences in cognitive inhibition with task 
performance across the different experimental conditions. If cognitive inhibition and 
interference resolution are the key processes involved in control of distraction during 
WM maintenance, participants with higher inhibitory skills should show higher task 
accuracy. However, our data did not show any correlation between inhibitory control of 
memory as measured by TAVEC and performance in our WM task. Notwithstanding, the 
absence of a significant correlation here may be due to the test we chose to measure 
interference resolution in WM. In TAVEC, as well as in the original CVLT, a list of items to 
memorize is presented and recalled five times before the presentation of the 
interference list, whereas in our task, faces were only presented once before 
interference. Therefore, items to memorize in TAVEC might become more resistant to 
interference than faces in our task. 
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Even though, one may be concerned about the possibility that, for some reason, 
pleasant stimuli do not capture attention in the same way than unpleasant ones. That 
might easily explain why pleasant distractors produced the same amount of forgetting 
than neutral ones, instead of other interpretations based on differential effectiveness of 
cognitive control over pleasant and unpleasant distractors. However, a recent study has 
shown that pleasant does capture attention more than neutral stimuli during the 
attentional blink phenomenon (de Oca et al., 2012). This points to cognitive control as a 
putative responsible mechanism for the low detrimental effect of pleasant interference 
on WM. We approached this issue in Experiment 2 by changing the TAVEC 
administration to obtain individual measures of interference resolution in short term 
memory. 
3. EXPERIMENT 2  
In the second experiment we first tried to confirm the unexpected finding of 
equivalent performance after pleasant and neutral interference showed in Experiment 
1. Second, we attempted to reveal potential differences in the effect of emotional and 
non-emotional interference in comparison to a non-interference scenario. Additionally, 
we modified the administration of the TAVEC (see Participants in Experiment 1) to 
prevent items to be memorized from become more resistant to interference than faces 
in our task. Then, if cognitive inhibition and interference resolution in WM are the key 
processes involved in the control of distraction, participants with higher scores in this 
capacity will show better performance in distraction conditions, but not necessarily 
during the free-distractor condition. Finally, we adjusted the selection of distractors in 
order to make pleasant and unpleasant conditions equal in arousal. 
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3.1. METHOD  
3.1.1.  Participants  
Participants were 43 students from the Complutense University of Madrid and 
the Camilo José Cela University of Madrid (mean age 21.6 years; range from 18 to 40 
years). They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 24 participants were females 
(18-33 years old and a mean age of 21.7 years) and 19 were males (18-40 years old and 
a mean age of 21.6 years). They all completed the Spanish version of the Spielberger 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults (Spielberger et al., 2002), the Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck et al., 2006) and the España-Complutense Verbal Learning Test (TAVEC), 
a Spanish version of the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT) (Benedet & Alexandre, 
1998) (see Table 1 for demographic information). In this experiment, items to memorize 
(list A) were presented and recall only one time (immediate recall), R before the 
presentation of the interference list. After this, participants were asked to recall the list 
A once again (post-interference recall). Participants received course credits for their 
time.  
3.1.2.  Materials  
Items at encoding and recognition were exactly the same ones as those used in 
Experiment 1 (see Materials in Experiment 1), and they were also counterbalanced 
across experimental conditions. For the interfering items presented at the maintenance 
period, 90 pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang et al., 
2005) were selected and matched in luminance, contrast, color and figure-ground 
relationships. They were divided in pleasant, neutral and unpleasant pictures. For this 
experiment we adjusted the criterion of selection to insure that pleasant and 
unpleasant conditions were equal in arousal (see Table 2 for mean normative values). 
First Study     55 
3.1.3.  Procedure  
A delayed-recognition WM paradigm with four experimental conditions non-
interference, pleasant, neutral and unpleasant interference was used and all of them 
comprised 30 trials. The trial structure, times of presentation and instructions were the 
same as those used in Experiment 1.  
 
Figure 3. Diagram of the delayed-recognition WM paradigm in Experiment 2. Three 
types of distractors (pleasant, neutral and unpleasant) were pseudorandomly presented 
during the maintenance stage. Volunteers were trained to learn and maintain the pair of 
faces into WM, look at the distracter, and then decide whether the face at the 
recognition stage is one of the two previously encoded or not, by pressing one of two 
keys. In a separate block, volunteers performed a fourth experimental condition with a 
maintenance period free of distraction. 
The order of trials was also constrained in the same way as in Experiment 1 (see 
Procedure in Experiment 1). However, non-interference trials were presented in a 
separate block to avoid potential experimental artifacts. Although a blocked 
presentation of non-interference condition may be considered a methodological 
inconvenience, results from previous studies has shown it as a suitable approach to 
avoid already reported experimental artifacts affecting performance after non-
interference WM maintenance (Anticevic et al., 2010). That is, if presentation of all the 
120 trials would have been intermixed, interference trials had been much more 
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common than non-interference trials. In addition, the period of time without any visual 
stimulation at the maintenance stage was much longer in non-interference trials (4 
seconds) than in interference trials (1 second at the most) (see Figure 3). Therefore, 
volunteers might have been surprised by the appearance of a non-interference trial. 
This could produce a worsening in performance for this condition not related to the 
processes we are interested in (Anticevic et al., 2010). Additionally, the order of 
presentation of non-interference and interference blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants in order to eliminate any potential practice or fatigue effect.  
3.2. RESULTS  
3.2.1.  Accuracy  
Figure 4a plots mean accuracy (hits and correct rejections) in each condition 
averaged across subjects. Non-parametric tests were employed since performance for 
non-interference, neutral and unpleasant conditions were not normally distributed.  
 
Figure 4. A: Mean accuracy (expressed as percent correct) in Experiment 2. Unpleasant 
distractors caused a detrimental effect on WM accuracy, compared to neutral and 
pleasant distractors, as well as to a scenario free of distraction (* p<.01; **p<.005; 
***p<.0001). B: Mean reaction times for accurate recognitions in Experiment 2. Pleasant 
distractors caused a faster performance on WM, compared to unpleasant distractors 
and a scenario free of distraction (* p<.05; **p<.01). Performance during unpleasant 
distraction might also tend to be slower than during neutral distraction († p=.07). Error 
bars represent standard error of mean. 
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Friedman’s test revealed a significant main effect of condition [χ
2
(3)=27.54, 
p<.0001)] and Wilcoxon’s test for pairwise comparisons showed lower performance 
during unpleasant interference compared to non-interference (p<.0001), pleasant 
(p<.002) and neutral interference (p<.002). Performance during pleasant and neutral 
interference were also worse than during non-interference (p=.001 and p<.01, 
respectively). 
3.2.2.  Reaction times  
Figure 4b shows mean reaction times for correctly recognized items in each 
condition. Friedman’s test revealed a significant main effect of condition [χ
2
(3)=8.38, 
p<.05)] and Wilcoxon’s test for pairwise comparisons showed faster performance during 
pleasant interference compared to non-interference (p<.01) and unpleasant 
interference (p<.05). Results from post-hoc comparisons also showed a faster 
performance during neutral interference than during non-interference scenario (p<.05). 
Although no significant, our volunteers might tend to respond slower after unpleasant 
than after neutral interference (p=.07).  
3.2.3. Subjective emotional ratings  
As expected, subjective valence ratings differed as a function of affective 
category [F(2,28)=243.95, p<.0001, eta squared=.94], with pleasant pictures rated as 
most pleasant followed by neutral pictures, and unpleasant pictures rated as least 
pleasant [mean valence ratings: 7.09 sd=0.46 (pleasant), 5.09  sd=0.55 (neutral), 2.37 
sd=0.97 (unpleasant), p<.0001 for all comparisons]. Arousal ratings also varied as a 
function of affective category [F(2,28)=258.91, p<.0001, eta squared=.94], with pleasant 
and unpleasant pictures rated as more arousing than neutral pictures [mean arousal 
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ratings: 5.40 sd=1.01 (pleasant), 1.92  sd=.66 (neutral), 6.71 sd=0.91 (unpleasant), 
p<.0001 for all comparisons]. Although both pleasant and unpleasant pictures were 
selected to be equal in arousal (see table 2 for mean normative values), our volunteers 
rated on average unpleasant pictures as more arousing than pleasant pictures (p<.0001) 
(see Table 2 for mean subjective values). 
3.2.1. Interference resolution in WM and performance  
In this experiment, interference resolution scores were calculated by subtracting 
the amount of items successfully remembered at the single immediate recall of list A 
from the amount of items successfully remembered at the post-interference recall of list 
A. Again, scores below zero represent loss of information due to interference, or low 
interference resolution ability, while scores equal-to or over zero represent no loss of 
information after the interference, or high interference resolution ability.  
Using this modified measurement, interference resolution in WM correlates 
positively with accuracy during pleasant and neutral interference (Rs= .38, p=.005 and 
Rs=.39, p<.005, respectively) so that the higher interference resolution ability, the better 
accuracy at the recognition stage during the WM task.Interference resolution in WM did 
not significantly correlate with accuracy during non-interference and unpleasant 
interference (Rs= .13, p>.1 and Rs=-.008, p>.1, respectively. No significant correlations 
were found between interference resolution in WM and reaction times for accurate 
recognitions, during any condition (see Figure 5 and Table 4 for scatter plots and 
correlation coefficients and significance values, respectively). 
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Figure 5. A: Scatter plots showing the relationship between interference resolution in 
WM and accuracy in each experimental condition of Experiment 2. B: Scatter plots 
showing the relationship between interference resolution in WM and reaction times for 
accurate recognitions in each experimental condition of Experiment 2. 
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Interference 
resolution 
Accuracy Reaction times 
Non-
interf 
Pleasant Neutral Unpleasant 
Non- 
interf 
Pleasant Neutral Unpleasant 
Rs .13 .38 .39 -.008 -.59 -.16 -.15 -.13 
Sig. (one-
tailed) 
.19 .005 .004 .47 .35 .15 .16 .19 
Table 4. Spearman’s correlation coefficients between individual interference resolution 
in WM and performance during the delayed-recognition WM task. Interference 
resolution in WM correlated positively with accuracy, during pleasant and neutral 
interference. 
3.2.2. Item analysis  
As we did in Experiment 1, we test the relationship between the emotional 
features of pictures and their value as interference during the WM task. To do this, we 
calculated the correlation between their valence and arousal subjective ratings, and 
accurate recognition likelihood and reaction times. Valence correlated positively with 
accuracy (one-tailed Spearman’s Rho=.23, p<.05) and negatively with reaction time 
(one-tailed Spearman’s Rho=-.27, p<.005), while arousal correlated negatively with 
accuracy (one-tailed Spearman’s Rho=-25, p<.05) and positively with (one-tailed 
Spearman’s Rho=-.20, p<.01). As previously mentioned, although we adjusted the 
criterion of selection to keep pleasant and unpleasant conditions equal in arousal, our 
volunteers rated unpleasant interferences as more arousing than pleasant ones. 
Therefore, partial correlations were also calculated in order to disentangle the effects of 
valence from the effects of arousal. In line with Experiment 1, valence correlated 
positively with accuracy (one-tailed ρvalence, accuracy ∙ arousal=.19, p<.05) and 
negatively with reaction time (one-tailed ρvalence, accuracy ∙ arousal=-.26, p<.01) when 
the effect of arousal was controlled. Again, no significant correlation was found 
between arousal and accuracy (one-tailed ρvalence, accuracy ∙ arousal=-.13, p=.1) when 
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the effect of valence was controlled. Though, arousal positively correlated with reaction 
time (one-tailed ρvalence, accuracy ∙ arousal=.19, p<.05). 
3.3. DISCUSSION  
In accordance with the first experiment and previous literature, highest 
forgetting occurs after unpleasant interference, extending evidence in favor of a 
biological relevance-based interference (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; 
Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006).  
As in Experiment 1, pleasant interference does not affect WM more than neutral 
interference. In this regard, although we equated pleasant and unpleasant pictures in 
arousal, our volunteers rated unpleasant pictures as more arousing than pleasant ones, 
and this might account for their differences in performance. However, if the effect of 
emotional distractors in WM were exclusively due to the arousal value, performance 
after pleasant distraction should have been worse than after neutral distraction, since 
pleasant pictures were also rated as more arousing than neutral stimuli. But this was not 
the case, as both pleasant and neutral stimuli showed similar levels of interference. 
Furthermore, results from partial correlations between subjective valence and accuracy, 
blocking the effect of arousal, and between subjective arousal and accuracy, blocking 
the effect of valence, showed a greater contribution of valence to the power of 
emotional stimuli as distractors. This general effect resembles the one observed in the 
first experiment, so that the more unpleasant is perceived a distractor, the higher 
probability of forgetting previously encoded information. Neutral interference did lead 
to a higher forgetting than after a scenario free of distractor, in accordance to previous 
results employing similar tasks (Anticevic et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). These 
62     First Study 
 
findings provide further evidence in favor of the detrimental effect of both emotional 
and non-emotional distractors in WM and strengthen the interference-based forgetting 
theories (Berman et al., 2009). 
If cognitive inhibition is the mechanism responsible for these differences 
between emotional and non-emotional interference, as well as between different 
emotional valence distractors, one would expect that individual differences in 
interference resolution capacity in short term memory predicted performance in each 
experimental condition. Therefore, higher interference resolution scores should 
correlate with better performance in the distraction conditions, but not necessarily in 
the condition free of distraction. According to this hypothesis, participants with higher 
interference resolution capacity showed less forgetting after neutral and pleasant 
distraction, but there was no relation between interference resolution and non-
interference nor between interference resolution and unpleasant distraction. If one 
bear in mind the growing role attributed to cognitive inhibition in mental processes 
(McLeod, 2007) and specifically in WM (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), it seems reasonable that 
individual interference resolution control is related to performance in an experimental 
condition which requires it, such as neutral interference, but not when it is not required, 
such as non-interference condition. More interesting is the pattern observed in the 
emotional interference conditions. As commented above, emotional stimuli are 
powerful interferences due to its biological relevance. Therefore, one might expect that 
higher degree of interference control was needed to override the automatic attentional 
capture elicited by emotional stimuli. However, this relation is only observed in the 
pleasant interference condition, in which performance is equivalent to neutral, but not 
to unpleasant interference. This suggests that greater interference resolution capacity 
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does not necessarily help to override the attentional response elicited by unpleasant 
stimuli. This effect may be in accordance with the conclusion proposed based on results 
from Experiment 1. The key aspect which makes emotional stimuli powerful 
interferences is related to the severity and specially, to the immediacy of consequences 
derived from ignoring them. Therefore, our cognitive control might momentarily 
override interference when consequences of doing it would not affect us in the short 
term, releasing attentional resources for the current task.  
Although results from reaction times were not as straightforward as in 
Experiment 1, they are in accordance with it, suggesting that unpleasant interference 
might produce higher cognitive cost even for successful performance. In addition, 
highest reactions times were recorded after non-interference WM maintenance. This 
may be motivated by the duration of maintenance stage without any stimulus (4 second 
without any stimulation), in combination with a relatively easy task (accuracy raised 
almost to 90% in this condition). Our volunteers might have experienced a decrease in 
their concentration level after encoding of information and might have been surprised 
by the probe stimulus, leading to slower responses to the test.  
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Few papers have addressed the effect of task-irrelevant emotional information 
during the maintenance of task-relevant non-emotional information, with the general 
finding that unpleasant interference mainly causes the worsening of WM performance 
(Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; 
Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). Furthermore, the effect of pleasant emotional interference 
in WM remains unexplored. In two studies we attempted to unravel the effect of both 
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pleasant and unpleasant distractors in WM, when compared to non-emotional 
distractors, as well as to a non-interference scenario. Results from both experiments 
confirm the general finding that unpleasant interference increases the probability of 
forgetting in short-term memory (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et 
al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). This effect has been previously 
explained by the biological relevance of emotional stimuli. Provided that emotional 
stimuli represent crucial information for survival, our cognitive system tends to process 
them automatically (Bradley et al., 2003). In general, this supposes an advantage since it 
helps us to exert more adaptive responses (Dolan, 2002) but when the most adaptive 
behavior entails ignoring emotional stimuli, they strongly compete with maintenance of 
relevant information, worsening performance of the ongoing task (Anticevic et al., 2010; 
Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). 
According to this idea, pleasant emotional stimuli, which are also better remembered 
when they are task-relevant (Schmidt & Williams, 2001), should similarly worsen WM 
performance. Unexpectedly, results from both, Experiment 1 and 2, showed equivalent 
performance for neutral and pleasant interference, suggesting that valence might be the 
crucial dimension in the emotional-based interference effect. This was further 
supported by partial correlation analysis where the effect of arousal was controlled (see 
sections Item analysis in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2). But, why do not pleasant 
distractors affect WM more than unpleasant ones?  It is probably related to the 
potential consequences of not to immediately pay attention to such stimuli, in an 
environment plenty of information which varies in relevance from time to time. 
Therefore, ignoring cues regarding feeding or predators just because our cognitive 
resources are dedicated to some other task, would definitively decrease our probably of 
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surviving. However, it is the immediacy of these consequences which makes the 
difference between ignoring pleasant and unpleasant stimuli. Medium to long-term 
survival or gene transfer are compromised when information related to food, 
reproduction opportunities or offspring care are ignored, while surviving probability is 
endangered in the short-term, if the individual ignores predator-related information 
(Ekman, 1992; LeDoux, 1990; Ohman, 1992). On the other hand, if any sort of survival-
linked stimuli systematically recruited attentional resources, we would probably fail in 
many other tasks, which would finally reduce our effectiveness to deal with a changing 
environment. Therefore, it seems reasonable that our executive control, specifically our 
inhibitory control, can momentarily override the attentional capture evoked by pleasant 
stimuli while we are performing another relevant task, provided that our survival is not 
immediately compromised. Thus, we might benefit from the result of successfully 
performing an ongoing task. By contrast, it also seem logical that our inhibitory control 
was blocked and unable to override attentional responses elicit by unpleasant stimuli, 
since it would immediately endanger our survival in favor of just a potential secondary 
benefit. This hypothesis is also supported by the relationship found between individual 
interference resolution capacity and performance in Experiment 2. There is no doubt 
that individual differences in cognitive inhibition are related to performance in WM, 
particularly when interference resolution is required (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). According 
to this idea, we found that volunteers with higher interference resolution scores 
performed better after neutral interference, which was not the case for free-distractor 
maintenance period, where inhibitory control is not so required. More striking is the 
differential pattern of correlation with performance after pleasant and unpleasant 
interference. Individual interference resolution scores positively correlate with 
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performance after pleasant but not after unpleasant interference, supporting our 
postulate that inhibitory control could override attentional responses evoked by 
pleasant stimuli but would not be able to do it in face of unpleasant ones. 
Previous studies in this field have addressed the effect of non-emotional 
distraction when compared to free-distraction maintenance. Some of them found 
equivalent performance after neutral distraction and after non-interference 
maintenance (Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010), while some others reported a 
better performance after non-interference scenario than after neutral interference 
(Anticevic et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). Our volunteers experience higher 
forgetting after neutral interference than during a free-distractor maintenance period. 
This result provides a further support in favor of the interference-based forgetting 
theories (Berman et al., 2009). 
Finally, a possible limitation of the current study is in regard with the subjective 
arousal ratings of participants in Experiment 2. Although we selected pleasant and 
unpleasant pictures equal in arousal, based on their IAPS normative values, our 
volunteers rated pleasant pictures as less arousing than unpleasant stimuli, which might 
make difficult to disentangle the effects of valence from the effects of arousal. However, 
results from partial correlations between these emotional dimensions and accuracy, 
blocking first the effect of arousal and then the effect of valence, points to the valence 
as the primary responsible dimension for the power of emotional stimuli as distractors. 
Furthermore, if arousal instead of valence were the most contributory dimension, 
performance after pleasant interference would have been worse than after neutral 
distraction, since pleasant stimuli were rated as more arousing than neutral pictures. 
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Even though, a partial contribution of arousal cannot be completely discarded, and 
further studies should account for this issue, trying to keep the emotional distraction 
conditions equal in arousal, not only based on their normative values but in the 
participant’s subjective ratings. Nevertheless, a potential partial contribution of arousal 
would not invalidate the immediacy of consequences of ignoring biologically relevant 
stimuli as the essential aspect that turns them into powerful interference. Indeed, it 
seems reasonable that those stimuli that immediately compromise our survival were 
perceived as slightly more arousing than those that do it in the medium or long-term. 
In conclusion, the present study further supports previous evidences showing 
that unpleasant stimuli do affect the maintenance of non-emotional information when 
they are not goal-task relevant, leading to worse performance. At the same time, this 
study shows for the first time that pleasant interference does not necessarily affect WM 
as unpleasant interference does. Second, the relationship between performance and 
WM interference resolution capacity points to the immediacy of consequences of 
ignoring such irrelevant information as the key aspect that allows executive control, in 
particular cognitive inhibition, to override attentional responses. Finally, this study 
contributes to clarify the effect of neutral interference in WM in comparison to free-
interference maintenance, showing that cognitive control cannot completely deal with 
neutral distraction, leading to a worsening of performance in comparison with non-
interference maintenance.  
  SECOND STUDY 
 Early detection and late cognitive control of 
emotional distraction by the prefrontal cortex 
   
1. INTRODUCTION  
Emotion and cognition interact in the human brain in order to develop a complex 
and adaptive behavior. According to some theories, emotional stimuli preferentially 
recruit cognitive resources (Armony & Dolan, 2002; Mogg et al., 1997; Ohman et al., 
2001), as they contain information that is closely linked to survival (Anderson & Phelps, 
2001; LeDoux, 1996; Ohman et al., 2000). This preferential access to our cognitive 
system could be interpreted as a mechanism developed to prepare us to effectively 
process biologically relevant information, so that we are finally able to build up and 
exert more adaptive responses. In the memory domain, such an effect has been 
consistently observed (see Dolcos, Denkova, & Dolcos, 2012; Dolcos, Iordan, & Dolcos, 
2011 for a review), and emotional memories has been reported as more vivid (Ochsner 
et al., 2000), accurate (Kensinger, 2007) and resilient to time (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, 
& Lang, 1992; Dolcos, LaBar, K, & Cabeza, 2005; Weymar, Löw, & Hamm, 2011) than 
neutral memories. However, such a preferential access of emotional stimuli might be 
problematic when we are engaged in a relevant memory process, as our cognitive 
resources may be depleted in favor of emotional information. Several studies have 
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shown that emotional information, specifically unpleasant emotional stimuli, can impair 
the retention of task-relevant neutral information in short term memory (Anticevic et 
al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006), and that 
individual differences in executive functioning as well as in the cognitive control of the 
emotional aspects of irrelevant information may account for differences in the ability to 
cope with emotional distraction (Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2013a, 2008). 
However, a recent study from our group (see the First Study of the present work) has 
explored the effect of other type of emotional distractors, those represented by 
pleasant stimuli. Results from that study showed that positively valenced emotional 
distractors do not affect WM maintenance, as unpleasant distractors do. That result led 
us to interpret that the key aspect that makes emotional stimuli powerful distractors is 
not directly related to their biological relevance, but to the immediacy of the 
consequences of ignoring such linked-to-survival information (see Discussion and 
conclusions of the First Study). 
Over the last 10 years, a series of fMRI studies have been devoted to disentangle 
the brain mechanisms that mediate such cognitive control of emotional distraction in 
WM. Most of these studies identified a dissociable pattern of activity between dorsal 
cortical regions, including the DLPFC and the LPC, and ventral brain areas, including the 
OFC, the VLPFC, the OTC and the amygdala (see Dolcos et al., 2011 for a review). 
Specifically, unpleasant emotional distraction seems to produce a decreased activity 
over dorsal brain areas which are known to be related to executive processes implicated 
in attentional processes and active maintenance of information in WM (Berryhill & 
Olson, 2008; D’Esposito et al., 2000; Derrfuss et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2009; Nee et 
al., 2013; Smith & Jonides, 1999). This reduction of activity has been interpreted as the 
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cause of the impairment in the maintenance of task-relevant information observed at 
the behavioral level. Besides, unpleasant emotional distraction enhances activity in 
ventral cortical and subcortical regions, which has traditionally been related to 
emotional processing and emotional regulation (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Kober et al., 
2008; Lindquist et al., 2012; Phan et al., 2002). Thus, increases in ventral activity due to 
processing of emotional distraction appears to exert a bottom-up modulation over 
dorsal brain regions, reallocating processing resources (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & 
Dolan, 2001) and finally impairing the behavioral performance. Moreover, this dorsal-
ventral dissociation was found to be specific for emotional distraction (Dolcos et al., 
2008). 
Nevertheless, WM maintenance is not affected by every single emotional 
distractor, so our cognitive control mechanisms seem to be able to override such 
negative bottom-up influence. Specific regions over that ventral emotional processing 
system, such as the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) and the VLPFC, which are widely related 
to emotional regulation processes (Aron, 2007; Kober et al., 2008; Ochsner, Silvers, & 
Buhle, 2012), have been found critically involved in coping with emotional distraction in 
WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 
2006; Dolcos et al., 2013a, 2006). Indeed, activation over those ventral prefrontal 
regions during emotional distraction processing seems to benefit WM maintenance of 
task-relevant information (Anticevic et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 
2013a, 2006).  
In addition to the evidence that points to a dorsal/executive-ventral/emotional 
dissociation as a general mechanism in response to emotional distraction, there are 
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several studies that found enhanced activity in dorsal cortices during unpleasant 
distraction in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, some of these studies showed that increases of activity in the medial 
frontal gyrus, the middle frontal gyrus and the postcentral gyrus were related to 
successful performance in the WM task (Anticevic et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010). 
These results are in line with extensive literature linking the DPFC with emotion 
processing (see Ochsner et al., 2012 for a review) and complement the whole picture 
regarding the spatial distribution of the brain systems that mediate the cognitive control 
of emotional distraction in WM. 
Although all these studies have established the brain areas that underlie the 
mechanism that allow us to cope with biologically relevant distraction, the temporal 
dynamics of this process remains unexplored. In the present study, we use MEG to 
characterize the spatio-temporal patterns of the brain activity that underlies the 
cognitive control mechanisms involved in coping with emotional distraction. Based on 
previous evidence showing an early processing of emotional stimuli (Batty & Taylor, 
2003; Bradley et al., 2003; Carretié et al., 2004; Pourtois et al., 2005), we predict that 
both, pleasant and unpleasant stimuli, but specially the latters, would increase the brain 
response at early latencies of distraction processing, when compared with neutral 
stimuli. Since such an early activation has been reported in perceptual tasks, in which 
the emotional stimuli do not have to be controlled, we also hypothesize that the 
effective overriding of emotional distractors would occur later in the processing, and 
that such cognitive control would be mediated by higher activation of prefrontal 
cortices, especially in the DLPFC and in the VLPFC. Finally, and based on previous results 
showing that positively valenced distractors do not affect WM maintenance as 
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unpleasant distractors do (see the First Study of the present work) we posit that 
differences between the cognitive control of unpleasant and pleasant distraction would 
appear at the brain activity level in a later time window. 
2. METHOD  
2.1. Participants  
Participants were 19 students from the Camilo José Cela University of Madrid. 
Data from 4 volunteers were excluded from the analysis because of failure of the 
behavioral response recording system (3 participants) or performance lower than 60% 
at any condition of the WM task (1 participant). Hence, analyses of the behavioral and 
MEG data correspond to 15 volunteers (7 males and 8 females. Mean age 20.06 year 
and a range between 18 and 29 years). They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
They all completed the Spanish version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
for Adults (Spielberger et al., 2002) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 
2006) (see Table 5 for demographic information). Participants received course credits 
for their time. 
2.2. Materials  
Items at encoding and recognition stages consisted of colored images of neutral 
faces. An oval mask was applied along the contours of the faces to remove ears and hair 
and avoid any potential non-face specific cues. A pair of faces was presented at the 
encoding stage while just one face was displayed at the recognition stage. Faces were 
assigned to different experimental conditions across subjects. For the interfering items 
presented at the maintenance period, the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) 
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(Lang et al., 2005) were scanned to obtain three sets of images that formed the 
pleasant, neutral and unpleasant distractors. Pictures in the pleasant and unpleasant 
distraction conditions were selected as to differ in valence but not in arousal. 48 
pictures between 8.5-6.5 valence and 7.5-5.5 arousal formed the pleasant condition. 
Other 48 pictures between 3.5-1.4 and 6.6-4.3 formed the unpleasant condition. Finally, 
48 medium-valenced (5.5-4.0) and low-arousing (3.7-1.7) pictures were selected for the 
neutral distraction condition (see Table 6 for mean normative values).  
 Age STAI-S STAI-T BDI 
Exp. 1 
Mean 20,06 15,07 12,36 6,46 
SD 3,21 7,17 5,88 5,10 
Table 5. Volunteer’s demographic information in the First Study. STAI-S: Spielberger 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults - State score; STAI-S: Spielberger State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory for Adults - Trait score; BDI: Beck Depression Inventory. 
Condition IAPS Valence IAPS Arousal 
Subjective 
Valence 
Subjective 
Arousal 
Pleasant 7,42 (0,33) 6,16 (0,49) 7,30 (1,00) 6,33 (0,94) 
Neutral 4,93 (0,35) 2,71 (0,38) 5,14 (0,49) 3,61 (1,33) 
Unpleasant 2,48 (0,52) 6,16 (0,41) 2,42 (1,03) 6,77 (0,93) 
Table 6. Mean normative values of pictures used in Second Study and mean subjective 
ratings of those pictures by our volunteers. Standard deviations are shown in 
parenthesis. 
2.3. Procedure  
A very similar delayed-recognition WM paradigm to the one employed in the 
Experiment 2 of the First Study, with three experimental conditions, pleasant, neutral 
and unpleasant interference was used (Figure 1). 
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 Each trial began with a 1000 ms intertrial interval (ITI), followed by the 
presentation of a pair of faces for 2000 ms (encoding phase). After a 1000 ms blank 
screen, an interfering stimulus was displayed for 2000 ms, followed by another 1000 ms 
blank screen (maintenance phase). Next, just one face appeared on the screen for 1500 
ms, followed by a 500 ms blank screen (recognition stage). Participants had to decide 
whether the face at the recognition stage has been one of the two previously encoded 
or not, by pressing one of two buttons. 
Each experimental condition included 96 trials in order to achieve an adequate 
signal-to-noise ratio for subsequent brain source estimation. Therefore, each one of the 
48 previously selected interfering pictures was employed in two different trials. To avoid 
inducing long-lasting mood states, the order of trials was constrained so that no more 
than three trials of the same condition were consecutively presented. To prevent any 
potential habituation effect, the two presentations of the same interfering picture were 
separated by a minimum of thirty trials. Before the experiment, all the volunteers 
underwent four training trials in order to ensure that they completely understood the 
task. These trials were not used later in the analysis. Once the WM paradigm was 
completed, all the pictures used as interference were presented to the participants out 
of the MEG system, and they were asked to rate them regarding emotional valence and 
arousal, using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) self-report scale (Lang, 1980). 
Participants were allowed to see each picture as long as they wanted, and the order of 
presentation of the pictures was also constrained in the same way, but in a different 
sequence, than for the WM task.  
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2.4. Data acquisition and preprocessing  
MEG data was continuously recorded (1000 Hz sample rate, 0.01–330 Hz online 
filter) during the performance of the WM task using a 306-channel (102 magnetometers 
and 204 planar gradiometers) system (Elekta©, VectorView), inside a magnetically 
shielded room (Vacuumschmelze GmbH, Hanau, Germany). Activity in electrooculogram 
channels was also recorded to keep track of ocular artefacts. Maxfilter software (version 
2.2., Elekta Neuromag) was used to remove external noise with the temporal extension 
of the signal space separation method (Taulu & Simola, 2006). 
Raw data was band-pass filtered with low and high cutoffs of 1 and 45Hz, 
respectively, and segmented for each trial beginning 300 ms prior to distractor onset 
and continuing for 2,000 ms. Baseline correction was performed for each trial, using the 
300 ms prior to distractor onset. Epochs were discarded from the analysis when 
containing eye, muscular or movement artefacts identified by visual inspection, or 
amplitudes higher than 3 pT.  
The output of this preprocessing stage was a set of artefact-free trials for each 
condition and for each MEG channel. For the subsequent analysis we decided to use 
exclusively the magnetometer data, since magnetometers will enable the analysis of 
deeper sources such as the orbital part of the frontal lobe and the cingulate cortex, 
which have been reported active in previous studies involving memory control 
mechanisms and emotional processing (see Iordan, Dolcos, & Dolcos, 2013 for a review). 
The whole analysis was performed using the Fieldtrip toolbox 
(http://fieldtrip.fcdonders.nl/) in combination with in-house-MATLAB
©
-code (The 
Mathworks, Natick, MA). 
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2.5. Statistical analysis at sensor level  
A minimum of 52 artifact-free epochs were averaged to obtain an event related 
field (ERF) for each participant and condition. To determine the time windows and 
channel locations of significant differences in magnetic amplitude between the three 
distraction conditions, dependent samples F-tests were used. To control for the 
familywise error rate in the context of multiple comparisons (time points and sensors), a 
cluster-based nonparametric permutation statistic (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007) was 
performed. Accordingly, clusters of channels and time samples with significant 
differences (p<0.05) were created by temporal and spatial adjacency (a cluster had to 
consist of minimum of two significant neighboring sensors). Then, a set of 2000 
permutations were created by randomly assigning condition labels and F-values were 
computed for each permutation. A cluster was considered have a significant effect if the 
sum of F-values in the original dataset was greater than the 95th percentile (p<0.05) of 
the distribution of the corresponding values in the randomized data. 
2.6. Source reconstruction  
Based on the statistical analysis of the ERF in sensor space, three time windows 
of interest showing significant results were established: 70-130ms, 280-320ms and 360-
455ms. To estimate the changes in brain activity that originated these differences, a 
source reconstruction in these time intervals was performed.  
2.6.1. Headmodels  
A regular grid of 2471 points with 1cm spacing was created in the template 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain (Collins et al., 1998). An anatomical label 
was assigned to each grid point with the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer & Landeau, 2002), 
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as implemented in the WFU software (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003). 
Then, this set of points was transformed into subject’s space and constituted the source 
locations. For that, an iterative closest point algorithm was used, that yielded a 4x4 
matrix (translation, rotation and resizing) that transformed a standard MNI skin into the 
subject’s headshape. The forward model was solved with a local spheres method 
(Huang, Mosher, & Leahy, 1999).  
2.6.2. Beamforming  
Source reconstruction was performed with Linearly Constrained Minimum 
Variance Beamformer (Veen, 1997). We followed a common filter approach that would 
ease the comparison between conditions (pleasant, neutral and unpleasant distraction): 
the spatial filter’s coefficients were obtained from the average covariance matrix from 
trials belonging to all three conditions and then this filter was applied to each condition 
separately. This procedure is performed for each time window separately, so that the 
output of this source reconstruction step consists in a power estimate per source 
location, condition, time window and subject.  
2.7. Statistical analysis on source space  
To search for differences in source power between conditions, dependent 
samples T-tests were performed. A clustering and permutation procedure was used to 
correct for multiple comparisons, as introduced for the Statistical analysis at sensor level 
section. However, the clustering step groups now spatially adjacent sources that show 
significant differences (p<0.05), and employs for that their 3D coordinates. 2000 
permutations were used to obtain the final and corrected p-value. 
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3. RESULTS  
3.1. Working memory performance  
As expected, Friedman’s test revealed a significant main effect of condition in 
WM accuracy [χ
2
(3)=12.21, p=.001)] (see Figure 6). Wilcoxon’s test for pairwise 
comparisons revealed that accuracy after unpleasant distraction was lower than after 
pleasant (p<.05) and neutral (p<.01) distraction. No differences were found between 
neutral and pleasant distraction (p>.1).  
 
Figure 6. Mean accuracy (expressed as percent correct) in Experiment 2. Unpleasant 
distractors caused a detrimental effect on WM accuracy, compared to neutral and 
pleasant distractors, as well as to a scenario free of distraction (* p<.05; **p<.01). Error 
bars represent standard error of mean. 
As each one of the 144 interfering pictures (48 pictures per condition) was used 
two times in each condition (see Procedure), one might be concerned about the 
possibility that a specific distraction might have produced less interference the second 
time  it appeared than the first one, due to potential habituation effects. Although there 
was a minimum of thirty trials between the two presentations of the same interfering 
picture, and behavioral performance was similar than in the two experiments of the 
First Study (see  Accuracy in Experiment 1 and  Accuracy in Experiment 2), we compared 
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the mean accuracy for distractors presented for the first and second time, for each 
condition separately. Wilcoxon’s tests showed that distracting pictures produced the 
same amount of interference both times they were presented as distractors for pleasant 
(p>.1), neutral (p>.1) and unpleasant (p>.1) conditions. 
3.2. Subjective emotional ratings  
As expected, Friedman’s test revealed a significant main effect of affective 
category in subjective valence ratings [χ
2
(2)=30.00, p<.0001)], and Wilcoxon’s test for 
pairwise comparisons showed that pleasant pictures were rated as the most pleasant 
followed by neutral pictures, and unpleasant pictures rated as the least pleasant [mean 
valence ratings: 7.14, sd=0.52 (pleasant), 5.09, sd=0.52 (neutral), 2.23, sd=0.82 
(unpleasant), p<.0001 for all comparisons]. Arousal ratings also varied as a function of 
affective category [χ
2
(2)=25.20, p<.0001)], with pleasant and unpleasant pictures rated 
as more arousing than neutral pictures [mean arousal ratings: 5.35, sd=1.20 (pleasant), 
2.27, sd=0.5 (neutral), 6.48, sd=0.48 (unpleasant), p=.001 for both comparisons]. 
Unpleasant pictures were rated as more arousing than pleasant pictures (p<.01) (see 
Table 6 for mean subjective values). 
3.3. Event-related fields  
The non-parametric cluster-based analysis performed on sensor-level data 
revealed three significant clusters of sensors that arose at three different temporal 
windows, indicating that the neuromagetic response to distracting emotional stimuli 
varied across conditions and in time. The first significant cluster (p>0.05) involved 35 
right sensors and emerged between 70 and 130 ms after the onset of the distracting 
picture. The second cluster (p<0.05) emerged about 280-320 ms, across 23 right anterior 
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sensors. Finally, a third significant cluster (p<0.05) was composed by 36 sensors 
bilaterally distributed and arose between 360 and 455 ms. Figure 7 plots the time 
course of the average neuromagnetic response for each significant cluster (see Figure 
7). 
 
Figure 7. Root-mean-square of grandaverage ERF waveforms in significant clusters of 
sensors as detected by permutation statistics between 70-130 ms (A), 280-320 ms (B) 
and 360-455 ms (C). Insets depict sensor cluster locations. 
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Although the topographical distribution at sensor space does not faithfully 
represent the actual distribution of the underlying cortical sources, this first analysis 
showed significant effects of distraction type and pointed out the specific time windows 
were these differences emerged. Thus, source reconstruction was performed for these 
time intervals, to investigate the changes in brain activity originating the observed ERF 
differences. 
3.4. Source-space activity  
Results from pairwise comparisons in each of one of the significant time windows 
identified at sensor level revealed differences between emotional and neutral 
distraction at early latencies (70-130 ms and 280-320 ms) and between unpleasant and 
both, pleasant and neutral distraction, at medium latencies (360-455 ms) at the source 
level. 
 
Figure 8. Cortical distribution of statistical differences in source power between 70-130 
ms. Emotional distractors enhanced source power in the DLPFC, the VLPFC, the OFC, the 
MPFC and the PosFC. Unpleasant distraction also produced increased activity in OC 
when compared with neutral distraction. 
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3.4.1. Early prefrontal enhanced activity by emotional distraction  
Both emotional distractions produced a significantly increased brain activity 
about 70-130 ms when compared to neutral distraction. Particularly, pleasant 
distractors enhanced source power in a cortical bilateral cluster (p < 0.0005) composed 
by a number of frontal regions, including the DLPFC, the VLPFC, the OFC, the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the posterior frontal cortex (PosFC). Unpleasant 
distracters also increased activity in two clusters, one of them over left frontal cortices 
including the DLPFC, the VLPFC, the OFC, the MPFC and the PosFC (p < 0.01), while the 
other one (p <0.05) was composed by the occipital cortex (OC) (see Figure 8 for cortical 
distribution of statistical differences in source power and Table 7 for specific cortical 
regions included in the clusters, as defined in the Automated Anatomical Labeling Atlas 
(AAL atlas) (Tzourio-Mazoyer & Landeau, 2002)). 
3.4.2. Increased temporal activation by unpleasant distraction  
Unpleasant distraction significantly enhanced activity in a left cortical cluster 
(p<0.05), relative to neutral distraction.  
 
Figure 9. Cortical distribution of statistical differences in source power between 280-320 
ms. Unpleasant distraction enhanced source power in the LTL, the MTL and the VTL. 
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This cluster of activity comprised regions over the superior (STC), lateral (LTC), 
medial (MTC) and ventral temporal cortex (VTC) (see Figure 9 for cortical distribution of 
statistical differences in source power and Table 7 for specific cortical regions included 
in the cluster, as defined in the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer & Landeau, 2002)). 
3.4.3. Cognitive control of emotional distraction at medium latencies  
Negatively valenced emotional distraction significantly enhanced brain activity at 
360-455 ms relative to neutral and positively valenced distractors. When compared with 
neutral distracters, unpleasant distraction increased brain signal in a bilateral cluster (p< 
0.005) distributed over the DLPFC, the VLPFC, the OFC, the MPFC and the PosFC, as 
wells as over the parietal cortex (PC) and the medial parietal cortex (MPC). 
 
Figure 10. Cortical distribution of statistical differences in source power between 360-
455 ms. Unpleasant distraction enhanced source power in the DLPFC, the VLPFC, the 
OFC, the MPFC, the PosFC and the PC when compared with both neutral and pleasant 
distraction. 
Unpleasant distracters also increased cortical activity when compared with 
pleasant ones, in a left lateralized cluster (p<0.05) which included the DLPFC, the VLPFC, 
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the OFC, the MPFC, the PosFC and PC (see Figure 10 for cortical distribution of statistical 
differences in source power and Table 7 for specific cortical regions included in the 
cluster, as defined in the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer & Landeau, 2002)).  
3.4.4. Brain activity and behavioral performance  
To further investigate the physiological meaning of the reported differences in 
brain activity while coping with emotional distraction, we segmented significant clusters 
into smaller regions as defined in the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer & Landeau, 2002) (see 
Table 7) and correlated the activity of the source that showed the maximal power in 
each region with task accuracy, for every experimental condition in each contrast and 
time window. 
 
Figure 11. The role of the prefrontal cortex in coping with emotional distraction. The 
brain activity in specific regions of the DLPFC, the MPFC and the OFC at the 360-455 ms 
latency of unpleasant distraction processing positively correlated with successful 
performance at the recognition stage of that condition of the WM task.  
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No significant correlations for any condition were found during the first and 
second temporal windows [False discovery Rate (FDR) corrected q=.05, for all 
correlations]. In the third temporal window, activity in specific regions of the right OFC, 
DLPFC and MPFC in unpleasant distraction positively correlated with accuracy, so that 
volunteers with greater activity over those prefrontal cortices were those who 
performed better at the recognition stage of that condition (p<.05, FDR corrected q=.05, 
for all the reported correlations) (see Figure 11 for specific localizations of brain regions, 
scatter plots, correlation coefficients and significance values).No significant correlations 
were found between brain activity and accuracy for neutral or for unpleasant distraction 
(FDR corrected q=.05, for all correlations), during this time window. 
L Hemisphere R Hemisphere 
 
70-130 ms Pleasant > Neutral 
 
DLPFC DLPFC 
Superior frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
VLPFC 
Superior frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
VLPFC 
Inferior frontal gyrus (triangular part) 
 
OFC 
Inferior frontal gyrus (triangular part) 
Inferior frontal gyrus (opercular part) 
OFC 
Superior frontal Gyrus (orbital part) 
Middle frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Superior frontal gyrus (medial orbital 
part) 
Gyrus rectus 
MPFC 
Superior frontal Gyrus (orbital part) 
Middle frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Superior frontal gyrus (medial orbital 
part) 
 
MPFC 
Superior frontal gyrus (medial part) 
Anterior cingulate gyri 
Median cingulate gyri 
PosFC 
Superior frontal gyrus (medial part) 
Anterior cingulate gyri 
Median cingulate gyri 
PosFC 
Precentral gyrus 
Supplementary motor area 
Precentral gyrus 
Supplementary motor area 
 
70-130 ms Unpleasant > Neutral 
DLPFC MPFC 
Superior frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
Anterior cingulate gyri 
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VLPFC OC 
Inferior frontal gyrus (triangular part) 
 
OFC 
Inferior occipital gyrus 
Middle occipital gyrus  
Superior frontal Gyrus (orbital part) 
Middle frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Superior frontal gyrus (medial orbital 
part) 
Gyrus rectus 
MPFC 
 
Superior frontal gyrus (medial part) 
Anterior cingulate gyri 
Median cingulate gyri 
PosFC 
 
 
 
 
Precentral gyrus 
Supplementary motor area 
 
  
280-320 ms Unpleasant > Neutral  
STL 
Superior temporal gyrus 
Heschl gyrus 
LTC 
 
Middle temporal gyrus 
Inferior temporal gyrus 
MTL 
 
Hippocampus 
Parahippocampal gyrus 
VTL 
 
Fusiform gyrus  
 
360-455ms Unpleasant > Neutral 
DLPFC DLPFC 
Superior frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
VLPFC 
Superior frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
VLPFC 
Inferior frontal gyrus (triangular part) 
Insula 
OFC 
Inferior frontal gyrus (triangular part) 
 
OFC 
Superior frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Middle frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Superior frontal gyrus (medial orbital 
part) 
Gyrus rectus 
MPFC 
Middle frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Superior frontal gyrus (medial orbital 
part) 
 
 
MPFC 
Superior frontal gyrus (medial part) 
Anterior cingulate gyri 
Median cingulate gyri 
 
 
Superior frontal gyrus (medial part) 
Anterior cingulate gyri 
Median cingulate gyri 
 
 
90     Second Study 
 
PosFC PosFC 
Precentral gyrus 
Paracentral lobule 
Supplementary motor area 
Precentral gyrus 
Paracentral lobule 
Supplementary motor area 
PC 
Postcentral gyrus 
Precuneus 
PC 
Postcentral gyrus 
Precuneus 
Inferior parietal gyrus 
 
360-455ms Unpleasant > Pleasant 
DLPFC  
Superior frontal gyrus 
Middle frontal gyrus 
VLPFC 
 
Inferior frontal gyrus (triangular part) 
Inferior frontal gyrus (opercular part) 
Insula 
OFC 
 
Middle frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
Inferior frontal gyrus (orbital part) 
MPFC 
 
Anterior cingulate gyri 
Median cingulate gyri 
PosFC 
 
Precentral gyrus 
Paracentral lobule 
Supplementary motor area 
Rolandic operculum 
 
PC 
Postcentral gyrus 
 
 
Table 7. Parcellation of significant clusters into smaller regions, as defined in the AAL 
atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Segmentation was performed for clusters obtained 
from every statical contrast, within each temporal window of interest. 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Previous studies have shown that emotional stimuli can impair the retention of 
task-relevant information when they are presented as distractors in WM. Most of those 
studies have focused on the effect of unpleasant emotional distractors and their power 
as interfering stimuli have been linked to its biological relevance for survival (Anticevic 
et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). 
However, a recent study from our group (see the First Study of the present work) has 
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shown that other type of emotional distractors, those represented by pleasant stimuli, 
were not so able to interfere WM maintenance, as unpleasant distractors were. Results 
of the present study further replicate that behavioral effect, showing greater 
impairment of WM maintenance after unpleasant distraction, while pleasant distracters 
did not affect WM retention more than neutral ones. 
However, the main objective of the present work was to unravel the temporal 
profile of the brain mechanism that underlies the cognitive control of emotional 
distraction in WM. To date, all the studies in this field have focused on establishing the 
brain areas responsible of that mechanism, while the temporal dynamics of that process 
have remained unexplored. Using a spatio-temporal cluster-based approach, we 
identified three temporal windows of interest, in which differences of activity between 
distractor types arose. During the earliest significant temporal window, about 70-130 
ms, both types of emotional distraction increased the brain activity when compared 
with neutral distraction, specifically over frontal cortices including prefrontal regions 
such as the DLPFC, the VLPFC, the OFC, and the MPFC. Activity in these prefrontal 
regions, particularly in the DLPFC and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) has been 
traditionally related to cognitive control processes during WM maintenance (D’Esposito 
et al., 2000; Nee et al., 2013; Smith & Jonides, 1999), and activity in ventral cortices such 
as the VLPFC and the OFC has also been linked to mechanisms of coping with emotional 
distraction in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; 
Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013a, 2006). However, the very early latency of 
those differences overlapped stages of processing that are mainly linked to the 
detection of visual stimulation, rather than to the cognitive control of this stimulation 
(Di Russo, Martínez, Sereno, Pitzalis, & Hillyard, 2002; Di Russo, 2003; Hillyard & Anllo-
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Vento, 1998). Besides, activity in those areas did not correlate with successful 
performance in the WM task, so that it does not seem probable that the early 
engagement of those prefrontal cortices was implicated in coping with emotional 
distraction. Many studies have highlighted the central role of top-down modulation in 
visual processing (see Bar, 2003 for a review), since the prefrontal cortex has been 
reported active in visual recognition (Freedman, Riesenhuber, Poggio, & Miller, 2001; 
Parker, Wilding, & Akerman, 1998; Wilson, Scalaidhe, & Goldman-Rakic, 1993) and, 
more interestingly, during visual processing of emotional stimuli (Kawabata & Zeki, 
2004; Kawabata et al., 2001; Northoff et al., 2000; Paradiso et al., 1999; Simpson et al., 
2000). Moreover, activity in the prefrontal cortex during both emotional and non-
emotional visual stimulation has been shown at very early latencies, about 100 ms after 
the onset of the stimuli (Freedman et al., 2001; Funahashi, Bruce, & Goldman-Rakic, 
1990; Kawabata et al., 2001; Thorpe, Rolls, & Maddison, 1983). Such an early response 
of the prefrontal cortex during visual processing has been interpreted as a top-down 
mechanism that facilitates visual recognition, based on three components: 1)  Low 
spatial frequencies in the visual stimuli are rapidly projected from early visual cortices to 
the prefrontal cortex, through the magnocellular pathway, which is known to early and 
quickly carry low frequency information (Bullier & Nowak, 1995; Maunsell, Nealey, & 
DePriest, 1990; Merigan & Maunsell, 1993; Shapley, 1990); 2) such a low frequency 
information activates simultaneous expectations for the recognition of the visual 
stimuli, in the prefrontal cortex; 3) finally, these expectations would be back-projected 
to posterior areas such as the inferior temporal cortex, where they activate the 
corresponding object representations that are combined with the bottom-up 
information for the final object recognition (Bar, 2003). This top-down processing of 
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partial visual information reduces the possible interpretations of the input and 
minimizes the amount of time required for the object recognition, which may be 
extremely helpful when the visual stimulus represents biologically relevant information. 
According to this model proposed by Bar (2003), increased prefrontal activation at early 
latencies of both pleasant and unpleasant distraction processing would reflect a top-
down mechanism that may improve our preparation to adaptively respond to linked-to-
survival stimuli. Particularly, enhanced activity in the OFC, which has been related to 
guessing processes and generation of expectations (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & 
Damasio, n.d.; Browning & Harmer, 2012; Elliott, Rees, & Dolan, 1999; Noonan, Mars, & 
Rushworth, 2011), would be crucial for the rapidly identification of biological 
information, as such contained in emotional distractors. 
Notwithstanding, the fast detection of emotional information per se is not 
enough for the cognitive control process required to override its influence when 
presented as a distractor. Our results also identified a later significant temporal window, 
about 360-455 ms, in which unpleasant distraction increased the brain activity when 
compared with both pleasant and neutral distraction. Differences in activity were 
distributed over the DLPFC, the VLPFC, the OFC, the MPFC and the PosFC, as well as over 
the PC. As commented above, activity in the DLPFC, the ACC and the PC has been largely 
related to successful performance in WM tasks (Berryhill & Olson, 2008; D’Esposito et 
al., 2000; Derrfuss et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2009; Nee et al., 2013; Smith & Jonides, 
1999), and these regions, along with the VLPFC and the PosFC, have been reported as 
important areas for interference resolution and inhibition of prepotent responses 
(Braver, Cohen, & Barch, 2002; Derrfuss et al., 2004; Jha, Fabian, & Aguirre, 2004; 
Menon, Adleman, White, Glover, & Reiss, 2001; Petrides, 2000; Picard & Strick, 2001). 
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Further analysis of our data revealed that activity in specific regions of the right DLPFC, 
the right MPFC -including the ACC- and the right OFC -including a portion of cortex that 
overlaps the inferior section of the VLPFC- positively correlated with successful 
recognition after unpleasant distraction. Although the VLPFC and specific regions of the 
DLPFC and the MPFC has previously been linked to mechanisms of coping with 
unpleasant emotional distraction in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; 
Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013a, 2008, 2006), the 
OFC has not been extensively related to successful control of such distraction (Anticevic 
et al., 2010). However, it does play an important role in tasks that require to inhibit 
prepotent responses (Casey et al., 1997; B. Jones & Mishkin, 1972; Kowalska, 
Bachevalier, & Mishkin, 1991), specially when such responses were established upon 
their previous reward value (Iversen & Mishkin, 1970). Taking into account that the 
attentional capture by emotional distraction may be seen as a prepotent attentional 
response that should be overridden in our task, it is conceivable that the OFC appeared 
implicated in inhibition of such an attentional response. Altogether, these results are in 
consonance with previous fMRI studies that have highlighted the implication of the 
VLPFC in coping with unpleasant emotional distraction (Anticevic et al., 2010; Denkova 
et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013a, 2006), and extend the 
evidence of activity in the DLPFC, the MPFC and the OFC in relation to the cognitive 
control of unpleasant distractors in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; 
Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008). Furthermore, that significant enhancement of 
activity about 360-455 ms, when effective control of distraction seemed to take place, 
were restricted to unpleasant distraction. This fact suggests that such a control 
mechanism may be exclusive for unpleasant distraction. The absence of differences 
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between pleasant and unpleasant distractors also suggests that coping with positively 
valenced distractors would not require additional resources to those engaged when 
coping with neutral ones, as reflected by an equivalent WM performance at the 
behavioral level (see the First Study of the present work and the Working memory 
performance section of the present study). 
Finally, results from our analysis also revealed a third significant temporal 
window that arose about 280-320 ms, between those temporal windows commented 
above. Pairwise comparisons at the source space revealed that unpleasant distraction 
enhanced the brain activity when compared with neutral distraction. Particularly, this 
enhancement of activity appeared over the superior, lateral, medial and ventral surfaces 
of the left temporal lobe. Dolcos and cols. (2013) have recently proposed that the 
impairing effect of unpleasant emotional distraction in WM may co-occur with the 
consistently observed effect of enhanced episodic memory for emotional events (see 
Dolcos et al., 2012, 2011 for a review). Their results showed greater activity in the MTL 
for those unpleasant distractors that impaired WM performance but were successfully 
remembered one week later. Furthermore, emotional distractors that did not impair 
WM were also accurately remembered on the episodic memory test. We proposed that 
the higher activity over the left temporal lobe in the unpleasant distraction condition of 
our task might be reflecting this effect of episodic memory enhancement for the 
unpleasant distractors themselves. However, this interpretation is only tentative, as we 
did not test the subsequent episodic memory for the distractors in our volunteers, and 
therefore we were not able to test a potential relation between temporal lobe activity 
and subsequent episodic memory for the distractors. 
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Although most of the previous studies in this field have identified a dissociable 
pattern of activity between dorsal cortical regions and ventral brain areas (Anticevic et 
al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et 
al., 2013a, 2008) when coping with emotional distraction, our results did not show any 
deactivation over the DLPFC and PC. Moreover, the dorsal activity identified in our 
analysis was always higher for emotional distracters than for neutral ones. However, all 
the previous studies that found such dorsal deactivations employed fMRI for their 
experiments. As the functional signal recorded in fMRI has a different origin than the 
MEG signal, since the first relies in the slow hemodynamic response while the latter 
records the very fast electromagnetic changes (Buckner & Logan, 2006; Lopes da Silva, 
2010), our results may not be straightforward compared with previous fMRI results. 
Nevertheless, the present study is not the first one reporting enhanced activity in dorsal 
cortices while coping with emotional distraction (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 
2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008) and extends the wealthy literature that 
links the DPFC with emotion processing (see Ochsner et al., 2012 for a review). In spite 
of these differences, the enhanced activity over ventral prefrontal cortices for emotional 
distraction in our results is consistent with previous literature concluding that the right 
VLPFC is critically engaged in coping with emotional distraction. Further, our results 
suggest that specific regions of the right OFC, partially overlapping the VLPFC, would 
also be important for overriding the emotional distraction. 
In summary, the present study reveals for the first time the temporal dynamics of 
the brain mechanisms that are responsible for our capacity to deal with emotional 
distractors in WM. At the very early latencies of the distractor processing, prefrontal 
mechanisms are engaged for the rapid detection of both pleasant and unpleasant 
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emotional distraction. Later in the processing, unpleasant distractors seem to recruit a 
specific cognitive control mechanism when compared with neutral and pleasant 
distractors. Such a mechanism depends on activity over the DLPFC, the MPFC and the 
OFC. Finally, in the meantime between the early detection and the effective control of 
the emotional distraction the increased activity in the temporal lobe, specially in the 
MTL, might be reflecting the well-known enhancement memory effect for emotional 
materials. The present findings contribute to extend our knowledge regarding the brain 
mechanisms of coping with emotional distraction in WM, and clarify for the first time 
the temporal dynamics of those cognitive control mechanisms. 
  
 THIRD STUDY 
 Dynamics of functional brain networks of coping 
with emotional distraction in working memory 
   
1. INTRODUCTION  
Active maintenance of information is the result of synchronized and sustained 
activity within local groups of neurons and over functional networks widely distributed 
across the brain (Fuster & Alexander, 1971; E. K. Miller, 1996; Uylings, 1990). Traditional 
approaches in neuroscience have demonstrated that several cortical regions across the 
fronto-parietal cortex support WM maintenance (Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; Linden et 
al., 2003; Pessoa et al., 2002; Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 2000; Rowe et 
al., 2000; Todd & Marois, 2004) and that occipital and temporal areas are related with 
the formation of sensory representation in visual WM (Desimone, 1998; Fuster, 1990; E. 
K. Miller & Desimone, 1994; E. K. Miller, Li, & Desimone, 1991; Miyashita, 2000; 
Ranganath, DeGutis, & D’Esposito, 2004). Moreover, recent investigations have shown 
that sustained long-range functional coupling between frontal and posterior areas is a 
key mechanism for maintaining information in WM (Gazzaley et al., 2004; Palva et al., 
2010; Rissman et al., 2004, 2008; Sarnthein, 1998; Sauseng et al., 2005). Since 
interference effects of irrelevant information in short-term memory have become an 
exciting field of research in cognitive psychology (see Jonides et al., 2008 for a review), 
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there is also an increasing interest in how interfering information affects such fronto-
posterior network and how our cognitive system is able to override the influence of 
distraction in such dynamic functional interactions. 
Several neuroimaging studies that have explored the effect of distraction on the 
functional network that sustains WM have focused in the prefrontal cortex and the 
posterior areas of the brain. Yoon and cols. (Yoon et al., 2006) have focused on the 
functional coupling of the DLPFC and the visual associative cortex during the delay 
period of a WM task with distraction. They showed that distractors with high similarity 
to the memorized material produced a disruption of the functional coupling between 
the DLPFC and the visual associative cortex, suggesting that the active maintenance of 
information is an emergent function of cooperative activity between the lateral PFC and 
the posterior sensory cortex. More interestingly, such a disruption of the fronto-
posterior functional connectivity has been shown to be restored after the presentation 
of the interfering stimuli (Clapp et al., 2010). This result was interpreted as a mechanism 
responsible for the reactivation of the information previously encoded, as the middle 
frontal gyrus is known to be implicated in refreshing the memorized information during 
the delay period (Johnson, 2003; B. T. Miller, Verstynen, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 2008). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have addressed the effect of 
emotional distraction in the cortical functional networks that sustains WM 
maintenance, as all the studies have focused on cortico-subcortical connections (Chuah 
et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2006). In accordance with previous literature, activity in the 
VLPFC, the DLPFC and the MPFC were shown highly coupled with activity in the 
amygdala during successful coping with emotional distraction. Finally, a recent fMRI 
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study (Clarke & Johnstone, 2013) has assessed the effective connectivity pattern during 
the maintenance period of a WM task, in which anxiety was inducted by threat of 
electric shock. Results of this study showed that the VLPC and the ACC exerted a top-
down modulation of the amygdala and its output to the prefrontal cortex, inhibiting 
threat processing and enabling WM performance without threat-related interference. 
In this study we address the potential effect of emotional distraction in fronto-
posterior cortical networks that have been related to the active maintenance of 
information in WM. Based on the existent literature showing a disruption of those 
functional connections (Clapp et al., 2010; Yoon et al., 2006) we expect that the fronto-
posterior network would be more disrupted by emotional distractors than by neutral 
ones. Given the emotional nature of our distractors, and according with the extensive 
literature that links the VLPFC to the successful coping with emotional distraction 
(Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013a, 2006; Iordan, 
Dolcos, & Dolcos, 2013; see also the Second Study of the present work) we also 
hypothesize that this prefrontal region would be highly functionally coupled with 
posterior areas. 
2. METHOD  
2.1. Participants, materials, procedure and data acquisition and 
preprocessing  
Since participants in this study were the same than in the Second Study, age and 
demographic information was exactly the same (see Table 5). Procedure, materials, data 
acquisition and preprocessing were also the same than in Second Study: WM task, faces 
at the encoding and recognition stages as well as emotional pictures from IAPS (Lang et 
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al., 2005), MEG data collection and preprocessing (see Materials, procedure and Data 
acquisition and preprocessing of the Second Study).  
2.2. Source reconstruction  
Based on the results obtained in the ERF analysis (see Event-related fields in the 
Second Study), we focused on three time windows for source reconstruction: 70-130ms, 
280-320 ms and 360-455ms. As longer time series generate more robust entropy and 
Mutual Information estimates (Knuth, 2006), temporal windows were enlarged to 100 
ms, so that the final temporal windows of interest for source reconstruction and further 
functional connectivity analysis were 50-150 ms, 250-350 ms and 360-460 ms. The same 
headmodels were used as in section Headmodels in the Second Study: 2471 points in 
MNI space that were transformed to each individual, and a local spheres method was 
employed for the forward modelling. The inverse problem was solved with 
beamforming (see Beamforming section, in the Second Study), yielding a time series per 
source location, condition, time window and subject. 
2.3. Functional connectivity  
Functional connectivity was computed between each pair of Regions of Interest 
(ROIs). Sources were first grouped into ROIs using their MNI coordinate and the AAL 
atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer & Landeau, 2002), as implemented in the WFU software 
(Maldjian et al., 2003). For each hemisphere, 41 cortical regions (a total of 82 cortical 
regions) were included. Next, the correlation between all sources belonging to a same 
cortical region was computed and the time series of the source with higher correlation 
values was selected as the representative time series for this cortical region, as 
proposed by Hillebrand and cols. (Hillebrand, Barnes, Bosboom, Berendse, & Stam, 
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2012). Then, functional connectivity between each pair of cortical region and trial was 
computed, using Mutual Information (MI). MI assesses the relationship between two 
time series using Shannon Entropy (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) and Information Theory 
(Pereda, Quiroga, & Bhattacharya, 2005), capturing both linear and nonlinear 
interactions. It quantifies the amount of information that is shared between two source 
time series. Mutual Information values were averaged over trials, yielding an 82x82 
connectivity matrix per subject and condition. 
2.4. Statistical analysis  
To compare functional connectivity between conditions, Friedman tests were 
first performed and a set of links with significant effects (p<0.005) was obtained. For 
significant links, pairwise comparisons were performed using Wilcoxon tests. Links with 
p-values under 0.005 were further submitted to a permutation procedure applied to 
correct them for multiple comparisons (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007). This procedure was 
similar to the one described in Statistical analysis on source space section of the Second 
Study. MI values were randomized and new Wilcoxon tests were performed, yielding a 
set of 2000 randomized W values. Then, the original W value was compared with the 
distribution of randomized W to obtain the final and corrected p-value. Only results with 
p<.005 were considered as significant links. 
3. RESULTS  
3.1. Working memory performance and emotional ratings  
As participants and WM task were the same than those described in the Second 
Study, WM performance was different across distraction conditions [χ
2
(3)=12.21, 
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p=.001)]. Accuracy after unpleasant distraction was lower than after pleasant (p<.05) 
and neutral (p<.01) distraction, and no differences were found between neutral and 
pleasant distraction (p>.1). Subjective emotional ratings were equal to those reported in 
the Second Study (see Working memory performance and Subjective emotional ratings 
of the Second Study for complete information). 
3.2. Brain Connectivity  
Results from pairwise comparisons after correction for multiple comparisons (see 
Statistical analysis) revealed higher level of brain connectivity in neutral distraction than 
in both emotional distractions, as well as higher level of connectivity in pleasant than in 
unpleasant distraction, at the very early temporal window (50-150 ms). By contrast, at 
the subsequent temporal windows (250-350 ms and 360-460 ms), unpleasant 
distraction increased the level of connectivity when compared with both pleasant and 
neutral distraction. Pleasant distraction also yielded higher connectivity values than 
neutral distraction in the last two temporal windows. 
3.2.1. Emotional-based depletion of brain functional connectivity  
Functional connectivity between brain hemispheres was higher in neutral 
distraction than in emotional distraction during the first temporal window of interest, 
between 50 and 150 ms. Specifically, functional coupling between parietal cortices, 
temporal cortices, as well as posterior frontal and posterior parietal cortices was higher 
in neutral than in unpleasant distraction. Interhemispheric functional connectivity 
between the posterior cingulum and the PC was also higher in neutral than in pleasant 
distraction. Finally, functional coupling between left anterior temporal regions and the 
left posterior PC was higher in pleasant than in unpleasant distraction (see Figure 12 and 
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Table 8 for specific functional connections between cortical areas, as defined in the AAL 
atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer & Landeau, 2002)). 
 
Figure 12. Statistical differences in functional brain connectivity at 50-150 ms. 
Interhemispheric functional connectivity over parieto-temporal cortices was higher in 
neutral distraction than in both pleasant and unpleasant distraction. Functional coupling 
between temporal and parietal regions was also higher in pleasant than in unpleasant 
distraction. Links in green represent significant higher connectivity for neutral 
distraction; links in red represent significant higher connectivity for unpleasant 
distraction; and links in blue represent significant higher connectivity for pleasant 
distraction. 
3.2.2. Prefrontal-posterior coupling and the restoring of WM network  
Unpleasant distraction significantly increased the level of connectivity between 
the prefrontal cortex and the posterior as well as the temporal cortex, between 250-350 
ms. Specifically, functional coupling between the right VLPFC cortex and the right PC-OC, 
and between the right DLPFC cortex and the left PC was higher in unpleasant than in 
neutral distraction, as well as between the ventral occipital cortex of both hemispheres. 
Unpleasant distraction also increased functional coupling between the right OFC and the 
right anterior temporal lobe when compared with pleasant distraction. Finally, pleasant 
distraction produced higher functional connectivity between the VLPFC and the PC of 
the right hemisphere than neutral distraction (see Figure 12 and Table 8 for specific 
functional connections between cortical areas).  
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Figure 13. Statistical differences in functional brain connectivity at 250-350 ms. 
Functional connectivity between the right frontal and posterior areas was higher in both 
pleasant and unpleasant than in neutral distraction. Functional coupling between the 
right OFC and the temporal cortex was also higher in unpleasant than in pleasant 
distraction. Links in red represent significant higher connectivity for unpleasant 
distraction; and links in blue represent significant higher connectivity for pleasant 
distraction. 
3.2.3. Increased functional coupling by unpleasant distraction 
Unpleasant distraction significantly increased the level of connectivity between 
the prefrontal, the parietal, the medial temporal cortex, and the superior temporal 
cortex more than neutral distraction.  
 
Figure 14. Statistical differences in functional brain connectivity at 360-460 ms. 
Unpleasant distraction enhanced functional connectivity in a network that comprised 
prefrontal, parietal and temporal cortices more than both neutral and pleasant 
distractors. Functional interhemispheric coupling between the PosFC and the temporal 
cortex was also higher in pleasant than in neutral distraction. Links in red represent 
significant higher connectivity for unpleasant distraction; and links in blue represent 
significant higher connectivity for pleasant distraction. 
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Unpleasant distraction also increased functional coupling between the bilateral 
OFC and the right ventral OC, as well as with the left insula, and between the left PC and 
the right OC, when compared with pleasant distraction. Finally, pleasant distraction 
increased interhemispheric functional connectivity between the PosFC and the STC 
more than neutral distraction (see Figure 12 and Table 8 for specific functional 
connection between cortical areas). 
3.2.4. Brain connectivity and behavioral performance  
In order to explore the meaning of the differential connectivity patterns 
described above, in the context of coping with emotional and non-emotional 
distraction, we correlated the mutual information value of every single significant link 
between brain areas with task accuracy, for every experimental condition in each 
contrast and time window. No significant correlations for any condition were found 
during the first temporal windows (FDR corrected q=.05, for all correlations). 
In the second temporal window, functional coupling between a specific region of 
the right VLPFC and the right occipital cortex in unpleasant distraction positively 
correlated with accuracy, so that participants with stronger coupling between those 
brain regions were those who achieved higher accuracy at the recognition stage of that 
condition (p<.01, FDR corrected q=.05). Finally, in the last temporal window, functional 
coupling between a specific portion of the left OFC and the left STC in neutral distraction 
positively correlated with accuracy, so that volunteers with stronger coupling between 
those brain regions were those who performed better at the recognition stage of that 
condition (p<.001, FDR corrected q=.05). No more significant correlations were found 
between other significant links and accuracy for any condition during these latters 
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temporal windows (FDR corrected q=.05, for all correlations) (see Figure 15 for specific 
brain functionally coupled regions, scatter plots, correlation coefficients and significance 
values). 
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Table 8. Significant connections between cortical regions as defined in the AAL atlas 
(Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). A total of 82 cortical regions (41 regions per hemisphere) 
were included in the analysis. R: Right hemisphere; L: Left hemisphere; Mid FG: middle 
frontal gyrus; Mid FG orb: middle frontal gyrus (orbital part); Inf FG oper: inferior frontal 
gyrus (opercular part); Rectus G: gyrus rectus; Post Cing G: posterior cingulate gyrus; 
Rolandic Operc: Rolandic operculum; Paracentr Lob: paracentral lobule; Poscentr G: 
postcentral gyrus; Inf Pariet G: inferior parietal gyrus; Supramarg G: supramarginal 
gyrus; Angular G: Angular gyrus; Sup Temp G: superior temporal gyrus; Mid Temp G: 
middle temporal gyrus; Heschl G: heschl gyrus; Temp Pole: temporal pole (superior 
temporal gyrus); Parahippoc G: parahippocampal gyrus; Lingual G: Lingual gyrus; 
Fusiform G: fusiform gyrus; Inf Occip G: inferior occipital gyrus; Calcarine: calcarine 
fissure and surrounding cortex. 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Previous research has shown that long-range functional coupling between frontal 
and posterior areas plays an important role in maintaining information in WM (Gazzaley 
et al., 2004; Palva et al., 2010; Rissman et al., 2004, 2008; Sarnthein, 1998; Sauseng et 
al., 2005). Additionally, recent studies have demonstrated that interfering information 
can impair WM retention by disrupting the functional coupling between the prefrontal 
cortex and the PC and other posterior areas (Clapp et al., 2010; Yoon et al., 2006). 
However, the specific effect of emotional distraction in such a fronto-posterior network 
has not been explored yet, although the VLPFC is thought to be crucial as it has been 
reported active in coping with emotional distraction (Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & 
McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013, 2006; Iordan et al., 2013; see also the Second Study 
of the present work), and functionally coupled with amygdala while overriding this kind 
of distractors (Chuah et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2006). 
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Figure 15. The role of dorsal fronto-posterior functional connectivity in coping with 
emotional distraction. A: The functional coupling between the right VLPFC and the right 
occipital cortex at the 250-350 ms latency of unpleasant distraction processing positively 
correlated with successful performance at the recognition stage of that condition of the 
WM task. B: The functional coupling between the left OFC and the left temporal lobe at 
the 360-460 ms latency of neutral distraction processing positively correlated with 
successful performance at the recognition stage of that condition of the WM task. The 
red link represents functional connectivity between cortical regions while coping with 
unpleasant distraction; the green link represents functional connectivity between 
cortical regions while coping with neutral distraction. 
Based on results obtained in a previous ERF analysis (see Event-related fields in 
the Second Study), we focused on three temporal windows of interest, in which 
differences between emotional and neutral distraction arose at the brain activity level, 
and we performed a whole-brain functional connectivity analysis.During the earliest 
temporal window of interest, between 50 and 150 ms, both types of emotional 
distractors seemed to reduce functional connectivity when compared with neutral 
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distraction, and this reduction appeared mostly between parieto-temporal cortices of 
both hemispheres. The parieto-temporal cortex is part of the fronto-posterior network 
widely related with WM maintenance (Gazzaley et al., 2004; Palva et al., 2010; Rissman 
et al., 2004, 2008; Sarnthein, 1998; Sauseng et al., 2005) and it has been consistently 
reported active during retention of information in WM (e.g. Corbetta, Kincade, & 
Shulman, 2002; Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil, & Haxby, 1997; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; 
Miyashita, 2000; Ranganath et al., 2004; Todd & Marois, 2004). Moreover, cortical 
regions surrounding the intraparietal sulcus are considered a primary hub in the 
network that sustains WM (Palva et al., 2010). Therefore, the observed functional 
disruption of this component of the fronto-posterior network, in comparison with 
neutral distraction, would be reflecting the attentional capture of emotional distractors 
while maintaining relevant information in WM. This interpretation is consistent with 
previous findings of disrupted functional connectivity in WM at the time an interfering 
stimulus is encountered (Clapp et al., 2010; Yoon et al., 2006). At the same time, 
unpleasant distraction also increases functional connectivity between the DLPFC and the 
OC of the right hemisphere. Since the DLPFC, among other prefrontal regions, has been 
reported active during visual recognition and, at early latencies of such a processes 
(Barbas, 1995; Funahashi et al., 1990; Paradiso et al., 1999; see also the Second Study of 
the present work) it has been proposed as a part of a top-down visual processing 
mechanism that would be highly adaptive in the fast detection of biologically relevant 
information (Bar, 2003; see also the Dicussion and conclusions section of the Second 
Study). Thus it is conceivable that functional coupling between the prefrontal cortex and 
the visual cortex was strengthened at an early stage of emotional distraction processing, 
when such a distraction may comprise linked-to-survival information. 
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However, a sustained depletion of the parieto-temporal component of the 
fronto-posterior network responsible of WM maintenance might lead to the 
interruption of such maintenance of information, and may finally produce the forgetting 
of the initially encoded materials (Clapp et al., 2011). According with previous studies 
showing that the functional fronto-posterior coupling is reactivated after the 
presentation of an interfering stimuli (Clapp et al., 2010) and that the degree of this 
reactivation can predict WM performance (Clapp et al., 2011), the disturbed parieto-
temporal coupling returned to levels observed in neutral distraction, in the second 
temporal window of interest, about 250-350 ms. More interestingly, both types of 
emotional distraction increases functional coupling between the prefrontal cortex and 
parieto-temporal cortices. Specifically, unpleasant distractors produced an increase in 
functional connectivity between the DLPFC and the PC, which can be considered as a 
part of the network that sustains WM maintenance (Gazzaley et al., 2004; Palva et al., 
2010; Rissman et al., 2004, 2008; Sarnthein, 1998; Sauseng et al., 2005), when 
compared with neutral distractors. This particular result that did not appear in the 
contrast between pleasant and neutral distraction, is consistent with the behavioral 
performance, as pleasant distractors did not lead to lower performance than neutral 
ones (see Working memory performance and subjective emotional ratings section). 
Thus, this enhancement of the DLPFC-PC connectivity might be related to the necessity 
of increasing the functional coupling in the network that sustains WM maintenance, 
when the most interfering distractor is encountered. In parallel, both emotional 
distractors strengthen the functional coupling between the right VLPFC-OFC and 
parieto-temporal cortices. As commented above, although cortico-cortical connectivity 
while coping with emotional distraction in WM has not been previously addressed, the 
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VLPFC is highly coupled with the amygdala and modulates projections from this nucleus 
to the prefrontal cortex while facing to emotional distractors (Chuah et al., 2010; Clarke 
& Johnstone, 2013; Dolcos et al., 2006). Moreover, the VLPFC is considered a crucial 
cortical region in the successful cognitive control of emotional distraction (Anticevic et 
al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013a). 
Therefore, we suggest that this specific fronto-posterior coupling might sustain specific 
control mechanisms of the emotional distractor. This hypothesis is supported by the 
positive correlation between the strength of this link and the behavioral performance 
found for the unpleasant distraction condition. 
During the last temporal window of interest, between 360 and 460 ms after the 
onset of the distractor, unpleasant distraction increased the parieto-temporal 
component of the abovementioned fronto-posterior WM network, in comparison with 
both neutral and pleasant distraction. Again, this effect might be reflecting the higher 
difficulty of maintaining relevant information in WM, when a powerful distractor is 
encountered. Besides, functional coupling between the OFC and posterior temporal 
cortices were stronger during unpleasant distraction than during both pleasant and 
neutral distraction. The OFC is known highly implicated in the inhibition of prepotent 
responses (Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi, 2001; Casey et al., 1997; B. Jones & 
Mishkin, 1972; Kowalska et al., 1991; Malloy, Bihrle, Duffy, & Cimino, 1993; Perret, 
1974), specially when such responses were established upon their previous reward 
value (Iversen & Mishkin, 1970), and so on it is likely to be involved when the most 
detracting stimuli appears. Unexpectedly, the strength of the connection between left 
OFC and STC during the processing of neutral distraction correlated positively with WM 
accuracy in this condition, while no links involving the left OFC correlated with 
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behavioral performance in pleasant or unpleasant conditions. Although this result 
seems surprising, as we have found the ventral and lateral parts of the prefrontal cortex 
strongly active and connected with posterior areas while processing emotional 
distraction (see Results section of the present study and the Second Study of the 
present work), we exclusively found positive correlations between both activity and 
functional connectivity of OFC in the right hemisphere (see Brain activity and behavioral 
performance section of the Second Study and Brain connectivity and behavioral 
performance section of the present study). Thus, it is possible that left OFC was 
generally engaged in overriding a different sort of distraction, and the right OFC was 
especially engaged in coping with emotional distraction. This tentative explanation 
would be in accordance with traditional theories that suggest that the left hemisphere is 
specialized in a number of cognitive processes, while the right hemisphere is 
predominantly involved in processing emotion (e.g. Erhan, Borod, Tenke, & Bruder, 
1998; Levine & Levy, 1986; Sauseng et al., 2005; Schwartz, Davidson, & Maer, 1975). 
The present study constitutes the first approximation to the temporal dynamics 
of the functional networks implicated in the maintenance of information in WM, while 
coping with emotional distraction. Consistent with previous literature in the study of the 
cognitive control of distraction in WM, our results showed that emotional stimuli 
produce a transient disruption of the parieto-temporal component of the well-known 
fronto-posterior network that is supposed to sustain the WM maintenance (Clapp et al., 
2010, 2011; Yoon et al., 2006). Indeed, such a disruption mostly affected an important 
hub in this fronto-posterior WM network (Palva et al., 2010). Our results also confirmed 
that this network can be reestablished for a successful behavioral performance (Clapp et 
al., 2010, 2011), extending previous findings from non-emotional distraction to the 
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emotional domain. More interestingly, functional connectivity between prefrontal 
cortex and OC is strengthened during the early detection of unpleasant distractors, as 
they might potentially contain threatening information (Bar, 2003; see also Second 
Study of the present work), while the enhancement of functional connectivity between 
the right VLPFC-OFC and posterior regions, probably reflects specific control 
mechanisms of the emotional distractor at medium latencies. 
The present findings highlight the temporal dynamics of the distributed network 
that sustains our ability to cope with emotional distraction, while providing evidences 
for differential mechanisms implicated in the maintenance of information in WM and in 
the effective control of emotional distractors. 
 
  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
   
In the General Introduction section we revisited the existent literature regarding 
the cognitive control of emotional distraction in WM, from the behavioral level to the 
most advance approaches consistent in applying functional connectivity methods to the 
study of the dynamical networks that sustain such a cognitive process. Our review 
identified several gaps in the current knowledge about how our cognitive system is 
affected by emotional distractors, and how it is able to override this effect, in order to 
accomplish a number of relevant tasks. 
At the behavioral level, it seems clear that unpleasant distractor can be powerful 
interferences in WM due to their biological relevance, although the effect of other type 
of linked-to-survival stimuli has not been addressed. In our First Study we replicated 
previous results showing that unpleasant distraction does affect the maintenance of 
non-emotional elements in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et 
al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 2008; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). However, pleasant distractors 
did not produce higher rates of forgetting than neutral ones, as one would have 
expected since they also represent very important information for our survival (i.e. 
food).  Then, if both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli are relevant for survival and we 
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tended to preferentially process them (Armony & Dolan, 2002; Mogg et al., 1997; 
Ohman et al., 2001), why only unpleasant distractors work as potent interferences for 
the maintenance of other elements in short-term memory, while pleasant distractors 
behave like neutral ones? In the Discussion and conclusion section of that study we 
argued that the reason because we are prepared to pay attention to and deeply process 
emotional stimuli is probably related to the potential consequences of ignoring them. 
Thus, if we do not pay attention to a dangerous animal our survival is immediately 
compromised. However, if we ignore food or reproduction-related stimuli, our survival 
will be compromised in the medium or long term. Therefore, it is reasonable that our 
executive control can override the attentional response elicited by pleasant stimuli for a 
moment, if we are performing another relevant task, since our survival is not 
immediately at risk (Ekman, 1992; Ohman, 1992). Hence, we may benefit from the 
result of successfully performing an ongoing task without compromising our survival. By 
contrast, it is also logical that our inhibitory control is blocked and unable to override 
attentional responses elicit by unpleasant stimuli, since it would immediately endanger 
our survival just for a potential secondary benefit. Further analysis confirm this idea, as 
the individual capacity of overriding interference in WM correlated positively with 
performance after neutral and pleasant distraction, but not after unpleasant distraction. 
At the brain activity level, several studies have provided substantial information 
about the particular brain regions involved in the cognitive control of emotional 
distraction in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; 
Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2013b, 2008, 2006; Iordan, Dolcos, Denkova, et 
al., 2013), showing that unpleasant emotional distraction may produce a decreased 
activity over dorsal/executive brain areas while increases activity in ventral/emotional 
General Discussion     123 
cortical and subcortical regions. This dissociation has been interpreted as an unpleasant 
distraction-based enhancement of bottom-up influences from ventral/emotional to 
dorsal/executive brain areas, which reallocates attentional processes deploying WM 
performance (see Dolcos et al., 2011 for a review). In addition, those studies have 
highlighted specific regions over both the ventral/emotional and the dorsal/executive 
systems, i.e. the VLPFC and DLPFC, that are critically involved in successful coping with 
emotional distraction in WM (Anticevic et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010; Dolcos et al., 
2013a, 2006). 
In the Second Study we explore the temporal dynamic of the neural activity that 
supports our capacity of coping with emotional distraction in order to understand the 
exact nature of this highly adaptive cognitive process. Our results revealed that 
prefrontal mechanisms were engaged at very early latencies of the distractor 
processing, allowing the rapid detection of both pleasant and unpleasant emotional 
distraction. Later in the processing, unpleasant distractors recruited a specific cognitive 
control mechanism that depended on the activity over the DLPFC, the MPFC and the 
OFC, for the effective control of such a distraction. The specificity of this mechanism in 
the unpleasant distraction is in accordance with behavioral results from our First Study, 
as it provoked higher rates of forgetting than both neutral and pleasant distraction. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that we need a specific high-order cognitive control 
mechanism for overriding such a powerful distraction. 
Despite of the increasing evidence regarding the brain mechanisms of coping 
with emotional distraction, very few experiments have investigated the effect this type 
of distraction on functional brain networks of WM, even though recent evidence has 
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suggested that long-range functional coupling between frontal and posterior areas as 
the key mechanism for maintaining information in WM (Gazzaley, Rissman, & 
D’Esposito, 2004; Palva, Monto, Kulashekhar, & Palva, 2010; Rissman, Gazzaley, & 
D’Esposito, 2004, 2008; Sarnthein, 1998; Sauseng, Klimesch, Schabus, & Doppelmayr, 
2005). Indeed, only three papers have applied functional connectivity methods in this 
field and all of them have limited their analysis to the particular connections between 
the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex (Chuah et al., 2010; Clarke & Johnstone, 2013; 
Dolcos et al., 2006), leaving aside posterior cortical networks known to be engaged in 
WM maintenance (e.g. Corbetta, Kincade, & Shulman, 2002; Todd & Marois, 2004). 
In the Third Study we applied a functional connectivity analysis to the data 
collected in the Second Study in order to address the potential effect of the emotional 
distraction in fronto-posterior cortical networks that have been related to the active 
maintenance of information in WM. Our results showed that emotional stimuli 
produced an early and transient disruption of the parieto-temporal component of the 
above described fronto-posterior network. Such a disruption was found at the same 
latency in which emotional distractors were detected, as reported in the Second Study, 
indicating that this early detection immediately provoke the disturbance of the fronto-
posterior WM network. However, and according with previous literature (Clapp et al., 
2010, 2011), such a disruption was reestablished for a successful behavioral 
performance. Moreover, both emotional distractors strengthen the functional coupling 
between the right VLPFC-OFC and parieto-temporal cortices at a relatively early latency 
of processing. For the unpleasant emotional distraction condition this coupling also 
appeared to be crucial for a successful WM performance and was accompanied by an 
enhancement of the DLPFC-PC coupling. This particular result that was exclusively 
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observed in the unpleasant condition is also consistent with behavioral results from our 
First Study and brain activity reported in our Second Study. Interesting enough, results 
from this Third Study suggest that the effective cognitive control of emotional 
distraction may begin even earlier than reported in Second Study, and that this fast and 
subtle mechanism could relies in long-range functional coupling. 
In summary, the present series of studies investigated for the first time the 
cognitive mechanisms of coping with emotional distraction, starting at the behavioral 
level, exploring the spatio-temporal profiles of the brain activity and finally investigating 
the underlying dynamical changes in brain functional networks. 
  GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
   
The present series of studies show that unpleasant stimuli do affect the 
maintenance of non-emotional information when they are not goal-task relevant. At the 
same time, these studies show for the first time that pleasant interference does not 
necessarily affect WM as unpleasant interference does. These results indicate that not 
any sort of emotional information can distract us when we are engaged in a relevant 
task, as our cognitive system seems to be able to resist pleasant distractors as well as 
non-emotional events.   
The relationship between performance and WM interference resolution capacity 
points to the immediacy of consequences of ignoring irrelevant information as the key 
aspect that allows executive control to override attentional responses. In other words, 
our cognitive control is able to inhibit our tendency to pay attention to pleasant events, 
as our survival will not be immediately compromised. Yet, we are unable to resist the 
attentional capture elicited by aversive events, since doing so, we will endanger our 
survival in the very short-term. 
Our exploration of the neural mechanisms involved in the processing of 
irrelevant emotional events shows that prefrontal cortices are highly activated at very 
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early latencies of the distractor processing, allowing the rapid detection of both 
pleasant and unpleasant emotional distraction. However, these prefrontal areas are also 
engaged in the actual cognitive control of emotional distraction later in the processing. 
Interestingly, the control of unpleasant events requires a higher level of activity over the 
DLPFC, the MPFC and the OFC, which is actually in accordance with the higher difficulty 
in controlling those events observed at the behavioral level. 
Nowadays, we know that active maintenance of information is not just the result 
of the neural activity over concrete brain regions, but it is rather sustained by 
synchronized activity over functional networks, widely distributed across the brain. Our 
analysis of functional connectivity shows that the early detection of emotional 
distraction produces a transient disruption of an important hub of the fronto-posterior 
network that contributes to sustain WM maintenance. Nevertheless, functional 
connectivity between prefrontal cortex and OC is strengthened during the early 
detection of unpleasant distractors, as they potentially contain threatening information. 
In line with our analysis of regional activity, the cognitive control of emotional 
distraction occurs later in the processing. At this point, the fronto-posterior network is 
reestablished for a successful behavioral performance, while the right VLPFC-OFC and 
posterior cortices become strongly connected as a mechanism to cope with emotional 
distractors. 
In contrast to the popular idea regarding the effect of emotion on cognition, this 
work reveals for the first time that not any sort of emotional information can affect our 
capacity to keep focused on important matters. Although we are able to cope with 
emotional distractors most of the times, unpleasant events are more difficult to control 
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and affect our cognitive efficiency more frequently than pleasant or neutral ones. Our 
results also reveal two different mechanisms that underlie our capacity to override the 
negative effect of emotional distraction. First, we need to detect the potential biological 
relevance of distracting events, as it is highly adaptive to be prepared to process them. 
This mechanism is underpinned by the prefrontal cortex, although such an early 
detection induces a disruption of the functional brain network that sustains relevant 
information for the ongoing task. Afterwards, the prefrontal cortex contributes to 
control the emotional distraction by means of higher local activity and by strong 
functional connections with posterior cortices of the brain. 
 
  LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
   
This series of studies have explored our capacity to cope with emotional 
distracting events while we are keeping in mind some relevant information, from the 
behavioral level to the neural basis of such capacity, using both, a traditional approach 
based on regional brain activations as well as a more cutting-edge methodology that 
allows us to study how distant areas in the brain work together. Despite the results 
obtained at those different levels of analysis, there are still some relevant questions that 
future research should address.  
Our First Study was based on the concept of motivated attention, and therefore, 
we assumed that both types of emotional stimuli recruit attentional resources to the 
same extend. However, it was possible that differences between pleasant and 
unpleasant distractors were due to differences in the amount of attention captured by 
them. Such hypothesis could be tested if volunteers processed every type of distractor 
to the same depth. A possible way to achieve that goal might be asking participants to 
evaluate some aspect of the distractors, for example whether the scene represented in 
the picture takes place indoor or outdoor. If volunteers performed equally well this 
secondary task at all types of distractions, one could be sure that they pay attention to 
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them to the same extent and therefore, differences between conditions could not be 
attributed to differences in attentional capture. 
In the Second Study, we used a correlation analysis to explore the relationship 
between brain activity and behavior. Although this is a common strategy, the most 
reliable way to address this issue would have consisted in comparing the brain activity 
during successfully performed and unsuccessfully performed trials. Still, the limited 
number of error trials in our experiment prevented us from applying source 
reconstruction to the corresponding data. Future research should increase the total 
numbers of trials to try to obtain enough data from unsuccessfully performed trials. 
Finally, in our Third Study, we explored the long-range functional connectivity in 
a wide band of frequencies. As this is the first study that explores the functional 
connectivity dynamics of our ability to cope with emotional distraction, we decided to 
focus on the three temporal windows in which differences between emotional and 
neutral distraction arose at the brain activity level. Hence, our decision to use the same 
range of frequencies that we used in the Second Study, in order to keep both analyses 
consistent. However, increasing evidence suggest that specific frequency bands, i.e. the 
alpha band, might be strongly related with inhibitory processes that are strong 
candidates to be engaged in our capacity to cope with any sort of distracting events. 
Future studies should analyze different frequency bands to unravel the potential 
contribution of each rhythm to our capacity to control the emotional distraction. 
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